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Surrogacy has been a point of contention for feminists and others since the 1980s. 
More recently surrogacy has developed a heightened profile within the media, 
imposing further scrutiny upon the social and legal perspective on motherhood.  
The legal framework surrounding surrogacy and, in particular, its construction of 
motherhood is a key area of concern.  Surrogacy openly, and obviously, challenges 
the hetero-normative family form.  Subsequently, surrogacy is the ideal lens 
through which to observe the legal framework surrounding mothers as this 
practice reflects the socially adaptable nature of motherhood.  This thesis argued 
that the legal regulation of surrogacy frames motherhood as a hetero-normative 
concept which is open to, and ready for, challenge.  This legal construction of 
motherhood, in the context of surrogacy, is in conflict with social understandings 
of motherhood. In other words, the way that surrogacy is currently regulated does 
not reflect the lived experiences of motherhood and requires urgent reform.   
The legal conceptualisation of motherhood should reflect the social experience of 
mothers.  It is crucial that societal and legal doctrines of motherhood coincide to 
present a comprehensive understanding.   This will ensure that women’s choices to 
engage with motherhood in the context of surrogacy are observed and protected.   
It is argued that contract law provides possible solutions to the difficult 
relationship between surrogacy and motherhood, helping to re-envision the legal 
hetero-normative framework currently governing familial structure and women’s 
choices.  The introduction of surrogacy contracts will offer greater legal 
recognition to non-normative families which are so prevalent within 
contemporary society.  The social reality of motherhood should be the starting 
point from which to develop a new legal framework.  This improved legal 
framework should incorporate alternative regulatory methods to fully address 















Deconstructing Motherhood:  














Master of Jurisprudence 






STATUTE LIST         5 
CASE LIST          6 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS        7 
 
1. INTRODUCTION         8 
1.1 Surrogacy: The Legal Context       9 
1.2 Chapter Outlines        10 
 
CHAPTER ONE: 
2. SOCIAL AND LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF MOTHERHOOD   15 
2.1 Introduction         15 
2.2 Defining Motherhood        16 
2.3 Re-conceptualising Motherhood: A Comprehensive Definition  19 
 2.3[a] ‘Creation of a Child’       19 
 2.3[b] ‘Upbringing of a Child’       20 
2.4 Gendered Approaches to Motherhood      22 
2.5 Legal Constructions of Motherhood      24 
2.6 Case Study: Re G (Children) (Residence: Same-sex partner)   26 
2.7 Gestational Motherhood: Opposing Positions     29 
2.8 After Re G: Subsequent Decisions      30 
2.9 Conflicting Constructions       32 
2.10 A Brave New World: Assisted Reproduction     34 
2.11 Recognising Non-Normative Families      36 
2.12 Conclusion         37 
 
CHAPTER TWO: 
3. THE LEGAL REGULATION OF SURROGACY     39 
3.1  Introduction         39 
3.2 Early Societal Response to Surrogacy      40 
3.3 The Warnock Report        42 
3.4 Legal Background        43 
3.5 The Brazier Report        49 
3.6 The Transferral of Motherhood      50 
3.7 Case Law – Contested Surrogacy Arrangements    53 
3.8 Case Law – Non-Contested Surrogacy Arrangements    60 
4 
 
3.9 A United Position?         62 
3.10 Critique – The Uneasy Road to Legal Motherhood    63 
3.11 Singled Out – The Non-Inclusion of Single People    64 
3.12 Conclusion         65 
 
CHAPTER THREE: 
4. RETHINKING SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS    67 
4.1 Introduction         67 
4.2 (Mis)understanding Surrogacy – Changing Attitudes    70 
4.3 Primary Failings – And A Solution      76 
4.4 Lack of Legal Involvement       78 
4.5 A New Surrogacy Act        79 
4.6 Legal Status of Surrogacy Contracts      83 
4.7 Intention         85 
4.8 The Israeli Example        87 
4.9 Criticisms of Contract Law and Surrogacy     91 
4.10 Motherhood, Contract and Surrogacy      92 
4.11 Shared Motherhood        94 
4.12 Shared Responsibility        97 
4.13 The Hetero-Normative Structure of Legal Parentage    102 
4.14 Further Considerations       104 
4.15 Conclusion         105 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS         108 
5.1 Conflicting Constructions       108 
5.2 New Beginnings        110 
5.3 Concluding Thoughts        111 
 




Adoption and Children Act 2002 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (as amended by the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008) 
Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Parental Order) Regulations 2010 (S. I No. 
985) 
Special Guardianship Regulations 2005 Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 




A v C 1985] F. L. R. 445 
Brixley v Lynas [1996] 2 F. L. R 499 
CW v NT [2011] EWHC 33 (Fam) 
R (on the application of Rose) v Secretary of State for Health [2003] Family Law 19 
Re A (Joint Residence: Parental Responsibility) [2009] Civ 358; [2009] 3 F. L. R 1593 
Re Adoption Application (Adoption: Payment)1987] 2 F. L. R. 291 
Re B (A Child) [2009] UKSC 5; [2010] 1 F. L. R 
Re C (A Minor) (Wardship: Surrogacy) [1985] F. L. R 846 
Re D (Contact and Parental Responsibility: Lesbian Mother and Known Father) (No. 
2) [2006] EWHC 2 (Fam) 
Re Evelyn No. B. R. 7321 (1997) (unreported) 
Re G (Children) (Residence: Same-sex Partner) [2006] UKHL 43; [2006] 1 W. L. R 
2305 
Re L (A Child) (Surrogacy: Parental Order) [2010] EWHC 3146 (Fam) 
Re MW (Adoption: Surrogacy) [1995] 2 F. L. R 759 
Re N (A Child) [2007] EWCA Civ 1053 
Re P (Minors) (Wardship: Surrogacy) [1987] 2 F. L. R 421; [1988] F. C. R 140; 
[1987] Fam Law 414 
Re P (Surrogacy: Residence) [2008] 1 Family Law Report 177 
Re Q (Parental Order) [1996] 1 F. L. R 369 
 
Re R (Residence) [2009] EWCA Civ 358, [2009] 2 F. L. R 819 
Re S (Parental Order) [2009] EWHC 2977 (Jud) 
Re X and Y (Foreign Surrogacy) [2008] EWHC 3030 (Fam) 







I give thanks to my supervisors Erika Rackley and Shaun Pattinson who have 




1.  INTRODUCTION 
There is nothing new about surrogacy.1  It is the practice ‘whereby one woman 
carries a child for another with the intention that the child should be handed over 
after birth’2 and has been utilised as a reproductive method for many centuries.  
However, the development of assisted reproductive technologies has broadened 
the scope of this practice widening its use in society.  The technology of in vitro 
fertilisation (IVF) has been subsumed into the practice of surrogacy and enables 
surrogates to give birth to children with whom they have no biological relationship 
thus separating gestation, biology and social care as typical ‘mother’ roles.  Eric 
Blyth observes that ‘[s]urrogacy is a social practice that, more than any other 
reduces parentage to its constituent parts.’3  Surrogacy therefore openly and 
obviously challenges hetero-normative ideals surrounding motherhood as a 
gendered concept driven by maternal bonding.  The surrogate rejects social 
maternity, leaving the care of the child to another woman thus repudiating 
gendered ideals about women as primary caregivers.   
 The challenge presented by surrogacy to hetero-normative constructions of 
the family unit has led to considerable societal response.  In 2010 alone, the public 
response to surrogacy was vast.  The practice has encountered celebrity 
endorsement, media attention and widespread coverage throughout the internet.  
For example, Barrie and Tony-Drewitt Barlow’s experiences’ of surrogacy as gay 
men is well-documented in popular media.4  High profile surrogacy arrangements 
such as those which include Elton John5 and Nicole Kidman6 have lead to renewed 
                                                             
1 N. Gamble, L. Ghevaert, ‘Surrogacy, parenthood, and disputes: are there any lessons to be 
learned?’ BioNews (14 February 2011) 
<http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_89334.asp?dinfo=AYhRMsAEPNA6dQvDaYPgfE89> accessed 
15 February 2011 
2 The Warnock Report, Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
(Cmnd. 9314, London, HMSO 1984) at para 8. 1 
3 E. Blyth, ‘Section 30: The acceptable face of surrogacy?’ (1993) (15) Journal of Social Welfare and 
Family Law at 248 
4 H. Vickers, ‘UK’s first surrogacy advice centre opened’(BioNews) (10 January 2011) 
www.bionews.org.uk/page_85336.asp Visited at 1 February 2011 
5 O Craig, ‘Elton John baby: “Thanks to Zachary, gay surrogacy will become more acceptable’ The 
Telegraph (01 February 2011) < http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/8235149/Elton-John-baby-
Thanks-to-Zacahary-gay-surrogacy-will-become-more-acceptable.html> accessed 16 February 
2011 
6 B. Bamigboye, ‘Surprise! Surrogate baby joy for Nicole Kidman and Keith Urban as they welcome 
Faith to the family’ Daily Mail (18 January 2011)  
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public interest in the practice not encountered since the 1980s.  This has led to 
broader consideration of how surrogacy is understood as a social practice, the 
ethical issues it presents, and how it is regulated in law.   
 Surrogacy is also a significant cause for feminist concern.  Alison Diduck and 
Katherine O’Donovan note that ‘feminism is concerned to ask questions about the 
lives of women, and the lives of women have traditionally centred upon their 
families.’7  This is particularly the case in the context of surrogacy.    Feminist 
concerns regarding surrogacy include the impact of surrogacy upon constructions 
of motherhood as it separates the ‘mother’ roles.  This thesis examines legal 
constructions of motherhood as it is a socially significant context for many women.      
 The objective of this thesis is to critique legal constructions of motherhood 
in the context of surrogacy and its regulation.  It examines to what extent societal 
constructions of motherhood are reflected and protected in law.  Using surrogacy 
as lens, it explores how far current legal regulation reflects society’s multi-faceted 
understanding of motherhood.    This thesis considers how the lens of surrogacy 
can be used to reshape the legal response to non-normative mothers in order to 
reflect the social reality and lived experiences of women.         
1.1 Surrogacy: The Legal Context 
 From same-sex parenting to recent celebrity surrogacy arrangements, 
surrogacy continues to inspire legal and ethical controversy - it is therefore 
unfortunate that the practice of surrogacy fails to provoke legislative concern.  The 
initial legal response to surrogacy was a knee-jerk reaction to the case of Kim 
Cotton8 in 1985.  This commercial surrogacy case was the first of its kind to be 
addressed by the courts and signalled the beginning of the debate surrounding 
commercial surrogacy and whether women could “sell” their reproductive 
services.  Societal attitudes towards surrogacy at this time were largely negative 
and in response to this, the Surrogacy Arrangements Act 1985 (SAA 1985) was 
                                                             
7
 A. Diduck, K. O’Donovan, ‘Feminism and Families: Plus ça change?’ at 1 in A. Diduck, K. O’Donovan (eds) 
Feminist Perspectives on Family Law (Routledge-Cavendish: 2006) 
8 Re C (A Minor) (Wardship: Surrogacy) [1985] F. L. R 846 
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enacted.    The SAA 1985 imposes a blanket prohibition upon commercial 
surrogacy.   
 As a reproductive method which may utilise IVF, surrogacy is also 
regulated, to a certain extent, by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 
(as amended by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008) (HFE Act).  
The HFE Act regulates surrogacy arrangements which involve medical treatment 
such as IVF or donor insemination, detailing who is to be recognised as legal 
parents in the context of surrogacy which may involve many potential parents.  
Surrogacy arrangements which are not commercial and are carried out at home 
are therefore unregulated.  One of the central criticisms of the HFE Act 1990, and 
indeed why it was extensively reformed by the HFE Act 2008 was that it ‘framed 
assisted reproduction law for heterosexual couples, aiming to shore up traditional 
family values and the institution of marriage and to discourage same sex and single 
parents.’9  This thesis will question to what extent the amended HFE Act 1990 
continues to preserve hetero-normative ideals for individuals who engage with 
surrogacy.  The review of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 was 
the ideal opportunity to re-examine the legal response to surrogacy to ensure that 
its prevalence as a socially accepted reproductive practice is recognised and 
protected.  However, surrogacy received very little attention in terms of assessing 
how the law works in practice, and in fact did not even address simple issues such 
as how many surrogacy births there are in England and Wales.  The legal context of 
surrogacy demonstrates legislative reluctance to engage with the practice, possibly 
due to the complex ethical issues surrogacy presents.  Analysis of statutory 
provision and case law is used as backdrop through which to identify the key 
issues with surrogacy regulation.  This thesis argues and demonstrates that 
current legal problems are a consequence of a rigid hetero-normative legal 
response to motherhood.   
1.2 Chapter Outlines 
 Chapter One maps out social and legal constructions of motherhood.  The 
first section of Chapter One identifies the various ‘mother’ roles recognised in 
                                                             
9 N. Gamble, L. Ghevaert, ‘In Practice:  The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 2008: 
Revolution or Evolution?’ [2009] Family Law at 730 
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society such as gestational, biological and social motherhood.  It assesses how 
these roles are constructed socially, utilising real-life examples of how motherhood 
is conceived in society.  Examples include adoption and step-parenting.  This 
section questions to what extent the act of mothering is integral to being a mother 
and to what extent these concepts are gendered.  The second section of Chapter 
One re-conceptualises social motherhood through development of a 
comprehensive definition of social motherhood.  This definition distinguishes the 
concept of being a mother and the act of mothering.  Feminist literature in the area 
of motherhood is unsurprisingly wide-ranging both within and beyond the legal 
sphere.  However, Katherine O’Donovan and Jill Marshall suggest that ‘[a]lthough 
the literature is vast, the distinctions between pregnancy, childbirth and rearing 
children are often blurred and rarely made explicit.’10  This thesis explicitly defines 
the differences between gestational, biological and social motherhood to assist 
with the overall aim of critiquing legal constructions of motherhood.  The 
comprehensive definition of social motherhood developed in Chapter One is 
utilised throughout the thesis in order to determine whether the social reality of 
motherhood is reflected in the specific the context of surrogacy in Chapters Two 
and Three.   
 Next, this section addresses gendered constructions of motherhood.  This 
thesis utilises a gendered ‘woman-centric’ construction of motherhood.  Drawing 
upon feminist commentary of gendered constructions of motherhood, it is argued 
that a ‘woman-centric’ approach to motherhood is required in order to adequately 
critique legal constructions because legal constructions of motherhood should 
reflect social reality.  The social reality of motherhood is that it is a socially 
significant context for many women and not men.  This section implores social 
commentary of women’s interaction with motherhood and their ability to make 
autonomous decisions in order to assess why motherhood should be framed as a 
gendered construct.    
 The definition of social motherhood developed in Chapter One is then used 
to evaluate the legal response to motherhood.  The legal response to motherhood 
                                                             
10 K. Donovan, J. Marshall, ‘After Birth: Decisions about Becoming a Mother’ at 102 in A. Diduck, K. 
O’Donovan (eds) Feminist Perspectives on Family Law (Routledge-Cavendish: 2006) 
12 
 
is explored through in-depth analysis of the case of Re G11.  This House of Lords 
case is significant for several reasons, most importantly because it examines and 
defines the differences between ‘natural’ (social) parenthood and legal 
parenthood, similar to the objective in Chapter One.  The application of this 
decision in subsequent case law is considered in order to assess the impact of this 
case.  Re G has been critiqued extensively within academic legal commentary and 
the viewpoints expressed are used here to outline how this case constructs 
motherhood.  In the context of Re G and subsequent case law, common themes and 
differences between social and legal constructions of motherhood are exposed.   
 Finally, Chapter One explores the construction of motherhood in the context 
of assisted reproduction.  Assisted reproduction is introduced to further 
emphasise the differences between the ‘natural’ mother roles.  By doing so, the 
importance of recognising non-normative motherhood due to the prevalence of 
assisted reproduction in society is emphasised.  Due to this importance, surrogacy 
is highlighted as the lens through which the legal response to non-normative 
motherhood can be examined.  Surrogacy challenges hetero-normative 
constructions of motherhood and therefore the legal response to this practice is 
pivotal in order to assess whether the law adequately responds to the social reality 
of motherhood.   
 Chapter Two utilises the social and legal constructions of motherhood 
established in Chapter One in the specific context of surrogacy.  Chapter Two first 
outlines the social and legal context to the current legal framework regulating 
surrogacy as a precursor to analysis of the legal construction of motherhood in the 
context of surrogacy. This chapter outlines the feminist and societal response to 
surrogacy to provide a contextual background to current legal regulation, referring 
to governmental response to surrogacy such as the Warnock12 and Brazier 
Reports.13  It is argued that the legislative response to surrogacy continues to be 
inadequate due to the prevalence of surrogacy in society and more importantly, its 
relationship with women’s lives as mothers.   
                                                             
11 (Children) (Residence: Same-sex Partner) [2006] UKHL 43; [2006] 1 W. L. R 2305 
12 n. 2 
13 Brazier M, Campbell A, Golombok S, Surrogacy: Review for Health Ministers of Current 
Arrangements for Payments and Regulation (Cmnd. 4068) (1998)  
13 
 
 Chapter Two highlights current tensions between legal and social 
constructions of motherhood in the context of surrogacy, suggesting that the legal 
response to motherhood is founded upon hetero-normative ideals surrounding 
motherhood.  As a consequence of traditional constructions of motherhood in law, 
the route to legal motherhood in surrogacy is difficult.  The status of legal mother 
must be transferred from one woman to another, however crucially the surrogate 
is the default legal mother.  Problems with this legal standpoint will be explored in 
relation to the transferral of motherhood and how the HFE Act 1990 facilitates this.  
A critique of the legal mechanisms utilised to transfer motherhood is offered, 
considering case law in the area of parental orders which extinguish the legal 
rights of the surrogate in favour of the commissioning party.   
 As a result of conflict between legal and social constructions, the social 
reality of motherhood as outlined in Chapter One is not represented in law.  This 
point is reinforced with examples from case law, in particular cases which are 
concerned with disputed surrogacy arrangements.  Also, single parents and their 
exclusion from the remit of the HFE Act in relation to parental orders are also be 
explored.  Attention to these issues details the real-life legal response to 
motherhood and indicates a legal preference for traditional constructions of 
motherhood which marry gestation and maternal care.  Overall, Chapter Two 
argues that a lack of legal response to surrogacy from the outset evidenced by lack 
of regulation has created an unstable platform from which surrogacy regulation 
has developed.  As a result of this, women’s interests as mothers are not protected 
and this should be rectified.   
 Chapter Three addresses the current failings of the legal surrogacy 
framework and offers a solution.  Consulting ‘surrogacy-friendly’ jurisdictions such 
as Israel, this chapter outlines a possible way-forward in relation to the current 
problems posed by a legal failing to respond to non-normative motherhood.  
Chapter Three suggests that the introduction of a new Surrogacy Act is required in 
order to improve the legal position on motherhood in the context of surrogacy.  
This new Surrogacy Act, it is argued, attends to current legal failings and could 
radically improve the way in which surrogacy arrangements are regulated.  It is 
proposed that an intention-based test is introduced to track the intentions of those 
14 
 
involved in the surrogacy arrangement which are then evidenced in the form of a 
surrogacy contract.  Chapter Three utilises examples from contract law (as 
expressed in academic literature) to develop a new legal structure for surrogacy 
which attends to the intentions of the parties involved, overall improving the legal 
recognition and understanding of the separate and various ‘mother’ roles.  In 
addition, this chapter claims shared legal motherhood and shared parental 
responsibility should be utilised in conjunction with enforceable surrogacy 
contracts to fully reflect the lived experiences of women as mothers in a legal 
context. 
 This thesis concludes that an urgent re-think of the current legal framework 
governing surrogacy is required because at present, the legal structure is guided 
by hetero-normative ideals which are detrimental to the autonomy of women.  
Ultimately, a new holistic model of legal motherhood in surrogacy is required in 
order to reflect the social complexities of motherhood in this context.   
15 
 
2. SOCIAL AND LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF MOTHERHOOD 
2.1 Introduction 
Though motherhood is often idealised as an exclusive mother-child bond driven by 
maternal instinct and biology, the social reality of contemporary motherhood 
challenges this notion.  The role of ‘mother’ is unrestricted in form, practice or 
personification.  Motherhood is a multifaceted concept capable of change.  Emily 
Jackson observes that ‘the meaning of motherhood...has always been culturally, 
geographically and temporally specific’.1  It will be argued that though the role of 
mother continues to be socially recognisable the amorphous nature of motherhood 
challenges idealised depictions and legal constructions of ‘mother’.   This chapter 
questions legal and social assumptions surrounding motherhood.   It will argue 
that social and legal constructions of motherhood are in tension because current 
legal regulation continues to utilise a restrictive hetero-normative understanding 
of ‘mother’ and the act of mothering which are at odds with social reality.  As a 
result of this, stereotypical ideals regarding motherhood are reinforced, negating 
and failing to recognise the lived experiences of many mothers.   
 
 This chapter aims to challenge the current static legal approach in order to 
question the extent to which the law reflects the social reality of motherhood.  It is 
important to examine and assess legal constructions of motherhood to ensure the 
reproductive autonomy and choices of women are protected in law.  Reproductive 
choices impact heavily upon the lives of women in both the public and private 
sphere.  Foregoing feminist concerns surrounding women’s career choices2, 
women’s pay3 and women and the family home4 are the unfortunate result of a 
gendered construction of women and maternity.  Consistent assessment of how 
law seeks to reflect social reality is therefore essential to achieving a legal 
framework which protects the autonomous choices of women and their 
engagement with motherhood.   
                                                             
1 E. Jackson, ‘Degendering Reproduction’ (2008) Medical Law Review at 347 
2 M. Goodwin, ‘Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Double Blind: The Illusory Choice on 
Motherhood’ (2005) (9)(1) Journal of Gender, Race and Justice 1 -54  
3 S. Fredman, ‘Reforming Equal Pay Laws’ (2008) (37) Industrial Law Journal 193-219 
4 S. Singer, ‘What provision for unmarried couples should the law make when their relationships 
break down? [2009] Family Law 234 - 238 
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2.2 Defining Motherhood 
 Ann Dally observes that ‘[t]he word ‘mother’ is one of the oldest in 
language’5.  The matriarchal figure known as ‘mother’ is recognisable in children’s 
fairy tales, literature and within every day family life. It is therefore unsurprising 
that societal understandings of motherhood now form part of our a priori 
knowledge concerning family relationships.  The societal understanding of 
motherhood is relatively straightforward and easily identifiable because of the 
‘mother’ role’s prevalence within society.  Mothers are recognised most obviously 
as women who have given birth. The most commonplace definition of ‘mother’, 
therefore, is focused centrally upon the gestational capacities of women to give 
birth and experience pregnancy.  Contemporary societal understandings of 
motherhood, however are inclusive of and extend far beyond this traditional 
conceptualisation of ‘mother’.   
 The Collins dictionary defines ‘mother’ as ‘a female who has given birth to 
offspring’ and more broadly as ‘a person who demonstrates ‘motherly qualities’ 
such as maternal affection.  First, this definition limits mother to being a woman 
who can give birth to a child.  Second, it defines ‘mother’(ing) as a practice.  In 
other words, a mother is a person who engages with the act of mothering.  
Mothering constructed in late modernity is narrated by women as the provision of 
care, education and a healthy environment (physically and psychologically) for a 
child – all of which are recognised in the context of ‘motherly qualities’.6  While 
women who give birth also often demonstrate motherly qualities, gestation and 
the act of mothering remain distinct. Many non-gestational mothers provide and 
care for their children and many gestational mothers do not undertake the practice 
of mothering.  This is evidenced by current social practices such as fostering, 
adoption and step-parenting.  To demonstrate this point, a step-mother has no 
gestational or biological relationship with her step-children but is nonetheless 
recognised in a social capacity as a mother. The conceptualisation of gestational 
motherhood and mothering as distinct represents current social perceptions of 
                                                             
5 A. Dally, Inventing Motherhood: the consequences of an ideal (Burnett Books 1982) at 17 
6 T. Miller, Making Sense of Motherhood: A Narrative Approach (Cambridge University Press 2005) 
at 12 - 13 
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mothers and how motherhood is experienced within society.  The path to 
identifying and defining motherhood is thus clear.   Within society, various types of 
motherhood are recognised.  The recognition of various types of motherhood is not 
a contemporary concept.  This distinction is also recognised within legal doctrine.     
 Baroness Hale in Re G7 outlines three broad ways by which a natural parent 
may be identified, ‘each of which may be very significant in the child’s welfare, 
depending upon the circumstances of the particular case’.8  First, Baroness Hale 
describes genetic parenthood.  She states that the genetic role is important as it 
enables the child to learn of their origins ‘which is an important component in 
finding an individual sense of self’.9 The second way through which to identify a 
mother is gestational parenthood.  Baroness Hale observes that gestational 
parenthood is clearly established as the mother who has given birth can be 
unambiguously identified.  Baroness Hale also recognises the ‘process of carrying a 
child and giving him birth’ as evidence of a ‘special relationship between mother 
and child’ developed throughout this period.10  Third, relationships developed 
upon the child’s social and psychological needs also identify a child’s mother.  This 
relationship is developed from the most basic level of feeding, up to educating and 
guiding.11 
 Baroness Hale’s construction of motherhood recognises the various mother 
roles and how motherhood is experienced in society.  Many women will sustain a 
genetic, gestational and social relationship with their child however an increasing 
number of women will not.  This is particularly the case for mothers who adopt, 
foster or step-parent their children.  The prevalence of these societal practices 
indicates that motherhood is a shared experience.  Adoption, fostering and step-
parenting demarcate gestational, genetic and social mother roles as separate 
entities.  It is often the case that the gestational mother will forego her role as a 
social mother, allowing this role to be assumed by another woman – however this 
is not always voluntary.  The commonality of adoption and other similar practices 
                                                             
7 (Children) (Residence: Same-sex Partner) [2006] UKHL 43; [2006] 1 W.L.R 2305 
8 ibid ~ Baroness Hale at para 33 
9 ibid 
10 ibid ~ Baroness Hale at para 34 
11 ibid ~ Baroness Hale at para 35 
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emphasise the relevance and acceptance of the separation of mother roles in 
society12.  It is therefore important that constructions of motherhood reflect this 
reality.   
 Outlining the parameters of the social reality of motherhood is also 
essential.  Without this, a balanced critique of the legal construction of motherhood 
in relation to women’s experience cannot be put forward.  So far, it is established 
that motherhood consists of both persons and action.  A woman is recognised 
through her pregnancy and also through her care-giving recognised by society as 
motherly.  However, if a woman does not self-identify as a mother in this context, 
this does not reflect the social reality of the lived experiences of women.  For 
example, a woman may give birth to a child but chooses not to care for the child.  
Instead, the child is adopted.  Although this woman has given birth, through her 
decision not to engage with mothering, she does not identify as a mother.  It 
therefore follows that self-identification as a mother is imperative to establish the 
social reality of motherhood based upon women’s experience.  Society may 
perceive this woman as a mother through her pregnancy but this is not the reality 
based upon her individual experience.  Tina Miller raises concern regarding 
narrative accounts of women’s experience as making sense of individual 
experience is often undermined when our experiences do not match the societal 
and cultural norm13.  In other words, a true account of individual experience, 
particularly in the context of motherhood, is perhaps unachievable.  However, the 
social reality of motherhood is not concerned with individualistic storytelling.  
 Jill Marshall comments that ‘[m]ost feminists would agree that the ideology 
of motherhood constructs both maternity and motherhood in terms of connection, 
physically and emotionally, and that women have not fitted in with the traditional 
idea of autonomy’.14  Primarily, motherhood is concerned with relationships.  In 
                                                             
12 The Office for National Statistics reports that there were ‘[t]here were 4,655 children entered 
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(2009) <http://www.statistics.gov.uk/cci/nugget.asp?id=592> accessed 20 February 2010 
13 n. 6 at 12  
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identity?’ (2008) (4) International Journal of Law in Context  at 176 
19 
 
response to liberal constructions of autonomy which create tension between 
autonomy and motherhood, Jennifer Nedelsky argues that it is important to ‘start 
with people in their social contexts’15 as this encourages narratives to develop 
which are inclusive of self-determination.  Autonomy is increasingly important due 
to the broad ways in which women can be identified as mothers.  Katherine 
O’Donovan and Jill Marshall note that ‘[c]ertain feminists have viewed women’s 
capacity for motherhood as a natural biological phenomenon, but one that thereby 
prevents women from being capable of living a fully autonomous life’16.  Women 
must and should be able to make autonomous choices about their engagement 
with motherhood due to the changeable nature of family form within 
contemporary society.  In drawing attention to women’s social contexts this will 
allow for self-identification and will in turn recognise women’s autonomous 
choices to engage with motherhood.   
2.3 Re-conceptualising Motherhood: A Comprehensive Definition 
 To critique the legal construction of motherhood and its ability to reflect its 
social reality it is essential to outline a comprehensive societal definition of 
motherhood.  The interpretation of motherhood developed and adopted 
throughout this thesis defines ‘mother’ as a woman who self-identifies as involved 
in the creation and/or upbringing of a child.   This definition is comprehensive for 
several reasons.  This definition incorporates the three various ways in which a 
woman is socially recognised as a mother, adopting Baroness Hale’s terminology in 
Re G.  This intentionally broad definition preserves both biological and social 
aspects of motherhood which are upheld in society as well as recognising women’s 
choices to engage with motherhood.  The ‘mother’ definition used throughout this 
thesis will now be examined, exploring its central elements.   
2. 3 [a] ‘Creation of a Child’   
                                                             
15 J. Nedelsky ‘Reconceiving autonomy: sources, thoughts and possibilities’(1989) (1) Yale Journal of  
7- 36 in ibid at 9 
16 K. O’Donovan, J. Marshall, ‘After Birth: Decisions about becoming a mother’ in K. O’Donovan, J. 
Marshall (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Family Law (Routledge-Cavendish 2006) at 104 
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 First, a woman is defined as a mother if she has contributed to the creation 
of a child.  This incorporates both gestational and genetic motherhood.  Through 
carrying/gestating a child, a woman’s involvement in the creation of that child is 
most clear.  A woman will carry a foetus for nine months, providing nourishment 
and care until the child is born.  Her role as mother is identifiable in her 
contribution to the creation of the child through her gestational capacities.  A 
woman is also defined as a mother when she provides ovum.  This creates a genetic 
relationship between a woman and foetus.  This genetic relationship is equal to the 
gestational relationship in terms of contribution to the creation of a child.   Both 
mother roles are essential to conceiving a child as without both, the creation of a 
child is not possible.  The gestational and genetic ‘mother’ roles may be fulfilled by 
different women and each are socially recognised as mothers.   Women fulfilling 
either of these roles must also identify themselves as a mother based upon their 
contribution to the creation of the child. 
2. 3 [b] ‘Upbringing of a Child’ 
 A woman involved in the upbringing of a child and not creation, engages 
with the act of mothering.  Sara Ruddick construes mothering as ‘a kind of work or 
practice’.17 Acknowledging the differences between children, Ruddick maintains 
that ‘there is sufficient commonality among children to define a “maternal” work.  
Children require protection in their vulnerable early years, nurturance to develop 
intellect and guidance to assist moral development.18  Ruddick’s construction of 
‘mothering’ as a practice is appropriate for this thesis in its aim to deconstruct 
motherhood as it detaches mothering as action from ‘mother’ as a mode of identity.  
By doing so, gendered normative constructions of motherhood which combines 
both being a mother and the act mothering, can be challenged.  The hetero-
normative ideal surrounding motherhood links gestation and ‘mother’ status with 
a responsibility to care for a child. In the instance of adoption, fostering and step-
parenting, it is clear recognition as a mother is not dependent upon gestational 
capacities.  Instead, mother status stems from the woman’s active engagement 
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with a child in her care.  The non-normative construction of motherhood 
challenges hetero-normative ideals as the conservative approach persistently 
attaches gestation to parental responsibility.  Traditional motherhood which 
describes the fulfilment of all mother roles by one woman is no longer perceived as 
the only form of socially recognised status as a mother.  Alison Diduck notes ‘single 
parent family living, step parent family living, non-co-residential family living, as 
well as same-sex family living have all demanded changes to the language, 
concepts and norms of family form’19 which is particularly relevant in the context 
of ‘mother’ status and its relationship with mothering.   
 Mothering conceived as singular practice is gender neutral.   Ruddick 
observes that ‘there is then no difficulty in imagining men taking up mothering…or 
women declining to mother’.20  Mothering is a distinct concept and thus male 
mothering and women who do not self-identify as mothers through their rejection 
of maternal practice is separate to identity as a mother.  Many women and men 
engage with mothering as fathers, grandparents and family friends.  This action is 
separate to rhetoric concerning definitions of mothers.  The relationship between 
mothering and recognition is conceived only when there is an interest in the 
creation of the child through the desire to participate in the upbringing of a child.  
This definition of ‘mother’ is inclusive of those who wish to engage with social 
mothering and at the same time does not exclude those who wish to assume a 
purely gestational or biological role and vice versa.  This is ultimately dependent 
upon the woman concerned identifying with the role of ‘mother’ and her interest in 
the child’s life.    
Ruddick argues that a comprehensive understanding of motherhood should 
‘represent birth giving as distinguished from and connected to mothering in a way 
that allow us to honour both of these activities as they play themselves out in 
women’s and men’s lives’21.  The definition of motherhood developed here is 
inclusive of birth giving and mothering as distinct and connected concepts.  This 
offers a clear social overview through which to examine the legal response to 
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motherhood.  However, the definition of motherhood presented here is 
subsequently gender-specific as it focus’ rests upon the experiences of women.  
The woman-centred construction of motherhood to be utilised throughout this 
thesis will now be explored.   
2.4 Gendered Approaches to Motherhood 
 The wide-ranging definition of motherhood utilised here is woman-centric, 
excluding men from being recognised as mothers or engaging with mothering in 
the specific context of motherhood.  This woman-centric approach attempts to 
reflect social reality and work upwards with an uncompromising standpoint that 
only women can be defined as mothers.  In 1982, Dally observed that 
‘[m]otherhood has become full of uncertainty and paradox, fraught with dilemmas 
at all stages…creating illusion and also being altered by it.’22  Over twenty years 
later, this remains the case and is why a women-centred approach to motherhood 
is required. 
 In recent years, motherhood as a gendered construct has received criticism 
and reaction.  The fathers’ rights movement, including the Fathers for Justice 
campaign group, utilised politically-motivated publicity stunts in order to 
campaign for greater access to contact with their child post-family separation.  
This backlash to women’s recognition as primary caregivers has provoked debate 
surrounding the roles of ‘mother’ and ‘father’ and the legal parity between them.  
Contrary to this, studies concerning the family home conclude that women 
continue to assume the role of primary caregiver and as a result of this often 
compromise their autonomy.  For example, many women who are single parents 
are often placed in disadvantaged socio-economic position due to continually 
changing and often ineffective child support schemes.  Julie Wallbank’s 
commentary on this issue maintains that ‘[f]eminist researchers should seek at all 
costs not to undermine…women’s subjective experiences, because they provide a 
useful source for understanding how power relations are constructed in society’.23  
Focussing centrally on women as mothers will expose the monolithic narrative 
                                                             
22 A. Dally, Inventing Motherhood: the consequences of an ideal at 17 
23 J.Wallbank, Challenging Motherhood(s) (Pearson Education 2001) at 35 
23 
 
which surrounds motherhood as a gendered construct.  It will help to break down 
hetero-normative ideals which reinforce power imbalances between men and 
women as mothers and fathers.       
 Martha Fineman argues that ‘[a]lthough women as mothers are not well 
represented in the legal or the political process, it is essential that their 
perspectives be articulated in the context of law and policy proposals’.24  Gender 
neutral constructions of parenthood will not assist in giving women as mothers a 
voice in the legal and political process.  Instead, it will undermine the subjective 
experiences of women in everyday life.   
  Fineman explains:  
‘Consistent with the feminist commitment to gender neutrality, parenthood 
– like personhood – has become the preferred designation because it 
encompasses both father and mother without the idealised (and real life) 
distinctions associated with those’.25 
 However real life distinction and the social reality of motherhood cannot, 
and should not, be ignored.  Fineman states that ‘[t]he very gendered and 
mothered lives most women live continue.’26 In society, motherhood is gendered.  
It is therefore nonsensical to create a false dichotomy of motherhood as gender-
neutral if women’s interests are to be observed and protected.  Ultimately, a 
gender neutral focus on motherhood may lead to ‘a further reduction of attention 
to women and women’s interests’27.  It is hoped that a construction of motherhood 
as a gender specific construct will achieve greater inclusion of women’s interests in 
all aspects of society. 
 Thus far, ‘mother’ is defined as both person and action recognisable within 
a broad range of family structures.  ‘Mother’ is a gendered concept and requires 
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self-identification within this role if a woman is to be defined as a mother socially.  
To what extent is the social construction of motherhood represented within the 
legal framework?  Legal constructions of motherhood will now be assessed, 
drawing out common and divergent themes within the legal and social response to 
motherhood.   
2.5 Legal Constructions of Motherhood 
 At common law, the gestational mother of a child is the legal mother.  
Gestation thus determines ‘mother’ status from the outset.  The starting point for 
legal motherhood is therefore determined by the gestational/biological 
relationship between mother and child which is unambiguously identifiable.  Legal 
motherhood is gender-specific.  In law, there can only be one legal mother and this 
title cannot be shared between individuals.  The statutory legal position states that 
the gestational mother is the legal mother28 and no other woman is to be 
recognised as such.  However motherhood can be transferred from one woman to 
another in a number of ways.   
 Legal motherhood may be transferred by the process of adoption.  If a child 
is adopted, the legal title of the gestational mother is extinguished and transferred 
in full to the adoptive mother29.  Adoption orders transfer parental responsibility, 
permitting the adoptive mother (and also her partner) to make lawful decisions 
regarding the child’s welfare.  Parental responsibility is the legal mechanism which 
describes the social act of mothering.    Section 3 (1) of the Children Act 1989 
defines parental responsibility as ‘all the rights, duties, powers, responsibilities 
and authority which by law a parent of a child has in relation to the child and his 
property’.  Adoptive mothers are recognised legally as mothers and in a social 
‘mother’ context as they engage with the act of mothering.   
 
 It is usually the case that upon transferral of motherhood, the legal rights 
and responsibilities of gestational/genetic mother are extinguished.  But there may 
be times when a mother does not want to or cannot actively engage with 
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mothering but may retain legal status.   Current legal regulation of motherhood 
permits wider transference of legal parental responsibility and recognises various 
types of mother beyond adoptive mothers. Whilst legal ‘mother’ status 
automatically awards parental rights and responsibilities, legal title and 
responsibility are two distinct mechanisms.  Parental responsibility can be 
awarded to step-mothers and foster mothers where the legal mother wishes to 
maintain her legal title.  Parental responsibility may be acquired through section 
4A of the Children Act 1989, residence orders30 and special guardianship (in the 
instance of foster carers)31.  Step mothers and fosters mothers are not recognised 
as legal mothers insofar as they cannot acquire legal title without the consent of 
the legal mother.  If step mother or foster mothers wish to achieve full legal 
parental title, the adoption process must be initiated.  However legal rights and 
responsibilities are transferred which removes the parental responsibility of the 
legal mother for a specified period of time.  The provisions enacted to transfer 
parental responsibility indicate a temporary form of motherhood.  At this point, a 
child has more than one legal mother.  To a certain extent, this reflects social 
understandings of motherhood.  As discussed, it is often the case that motherhood 
is a shared experience and a child may recognise a number of women as its 
mother.  The legal approach to temporary motherhood corresponds well with 
current social perceptions of motherhood and reflects the lived experiences of 
many women.  It is therefore unfortunate that temporary motherhood status and 
the legal recognition it affords to various women in relation to a child is not the 
starting point from which legal motherhood is awarded.  Instead, a two-parent 
dyadic family form is preferred as only one legal mother (and one other legal 
parent, either a same-sex partner or father) with full legal title is allowed at any 
one time.  Even though a child may recognise two mothers within their family 
structure, only one of these women is recognised as their legal mother although 
both may have legal responsibility.  Is this situation problematic?  Further even, 
what is the social significance of this? 
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 Andrew Bainham argues that there is a ‘pervasive concern about the social 
acceptability of personal and family relationships and the need to secure for them 
the imprimatur of the law.’32   Due to the two-parent dyadic structure, it is clear 
that law is not responding to the contemporary family form.  Through recognition 
of step-mothers and adoption, transferring and attaching legal status in the form of 
parental responsibility, it appears that law goes some way to secure legal 
recognition for the various ‘mother’ roles, but still has a considerable way to go.  
Leanne Smith comments, ‘[i]t is arguably one of the great strengths of English 
family law that several adults may exercise parental responsibility in relation to 
the same child concurrently’33 and whilst it is evident that the law recognises 
multifarious types of mother, legal recognition of the various mother roles is not 
equal or developed always entirely upon the best interests of the child.  This can be 
seen most obviously when there when there is conflict between the legal interests 
of the various mother roles. The legal response to conflict provides greater insight 
into the legal construction of motherhood in practice.   
2.6        Case Study: Re G (Children) (Residence: Same-sex partner)34 
               Re G is an example of how the law responds to motherhood in practice.  
This case concerns conflict between two women who both wished to receive legal 
recognition as mothers in a social context.  Both women wished to acquire parental 
responsibility which would provide them with rights and responsibilities in 
relation to the upbringing of their child.  This case study will detail how the House 
of Lords responded to this and examine how the outcome of this case is relevant to 
the critique of the legal construction of motherhood presented here.   
              Re G involved a separated lesbian couple, CG and CW.  Using artificial 
insemination to develop a family, CG gave birth to two children, both of which 
were raised by CG and CW together.  Upon separation, the children resided with 
CG, and CW applied for a joint residence order which was at first rejected, and then 
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granted by the Court of Appeal.  CG then moved from Leicester to Cornwall without 
notice and it was feared by CW that although contact with the children remained at 
present, this would gradually diminish. At this point a sole residence order was 
awarded to CW.  This decision was unanimously dismissed by the House of Lords, 
and the sole care order removed.   
 The primary issue in the case of Re G was that although both women were 
recognised as mothers in various forms in a social context, both parties wished to 
acquire legal recognition to allow them to fulfil the role of social mother as a result 
of the relationship between mother and child.  This case explicitly sought to 
address the definitions of ‘natural’ and ‘legal’ parent.  As indicated earlier, 
Baroness Hale of Richmond outlined the three possible ways through which 
parenthood is identified, explicitly distinguishing forms of ‘natural’ parent 
(gestation, genetic and social) from legal parenthood.  Further, Baroness Hale 
emphasised ‘the fact that CG is the natural mother of these children in every sense 
of that term, while raising no presumption in her favour, is undoubtedly an 
important and significant factor in determining what will be best for them now and 
in the future’35.  There are two key points to make here. First, Baroness Hale’s 
distinction between ‘natural’ and ‘legal’ parenthood was championed within 
academic commentary surrounding Re G. Robert Stevens notes, Baroness Hale’s 
decision ‘emphasised the relational nature of family law, recognising ‘psychological 
relationships) as well as the gestational ones) between children and adults’.36   
Recognising the relational nature of families in a broader social context in law is 
essential if law is to reflect the social reality of motherhood with a view to 
improving women’s recognition as mothers.   
 Additionally, sexuality in family law cases has previously been an important 
(often discriminatory) factor as was the case in C v C (A Minor) (Custody: Appeal).37 
Re G potentially signifies ‘a new dawn for lesbian parents’ as same-sex parenting 
and heterosexual parenting cases of this kind are to be treated equally.  Baroness 
Hale states ‘the issues arising are just the same as those which may arise between 
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heterosexual couples.  The legal principles are also the same’.38  This reflects the 
social reality of lesbian parents who identify themselves as mothers but who do 
not have a gestational or genetic relationship with the child.  Previously case law 
concerning same-sex parenting has placed great emphasis upon the biological 
connections between parent and child.  In J v C39 the House of Lords ‘were at pains 
to state that the welfare principle (and thus a child’s best interests) would be best 
facilitated by ‘maintaining the tie of nature’ as observed by Sarah Beresford40.   In 
Re G natural parenthood is not specifically defined by biology in the form of genetic 
or gestational parenthood as was the case in J v C.  Instead, the definition of natural 
parent is far broader.  This then leads on to consideration of the second key point 
in relation to this case. 
 Baroness Hale’s widening of the framework to identify natural parenthood 
is not without its problems.  Beresford argues that the language of law used here, 
defining natural as beyond the biological ‘still retains the power of inclusion and 
exclusion.  Thus, that which is natural is included, and that which is not is excluded.  
Only the judge can make this determination’41.   Beresford argues that Baroness 
Hale has created a hierarchy of ‘natural’ with biological parenthood being at the 
top’ because nowhere in Hale’s opinion does she ‘emphasise the importance of a 
child being reared by her psychological or gestational parent’ in the same way as 
she emphasises biological parenthood.42  Daniel Coombes argues that the 
gestational relationship ‘between mother and child is probably the most significant 
aspect of the decision’43 and therefore conflation of ‘natural’ and ‘gestation’ have 
undermined Baroness Hale’s seemingly broad approach to parenthood.   
 However, although CG in this case was the gestational mother and the 
default legal mother, Baroness Hale explicated stated that there is no presumption 
in her favour44.  Baroness Hale’s reasoning for returning custody to CG is founded 
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upon the separation of ‘natural’ mother roles, emphasising the distinction between 
‘natural’ mother roles as opposed to ‘natural’ and legal distinctions.   CG did not 
experience a gestational relationship that ‘is different from any other’45 with her 
child and this played an important role when assessing the best interests of the 
child.  Unfortunately, Baroness Hale’s attempt to clarify the distinction between 
natural parenthood and legal presumption is undermined by Lord Nicholls’ 
opposing comments.     
2.7 Gestational Motherhood: Opposing Positions 
 Within the House of Lords judgment in Re G opposing positions in relation 
to the construction of gestational motherhood are apparent.  Baroness Hale’s 
welfare judgment in favour of the gestational mother was because gestation ‘must 
count for something in the majority of cases’ but it does not induce a legal 
presumption of the gestational mother overturning the decision in J v C.  Lord 
Nicholls however placed the role of gestation and biology more broadly as the 
criteria through which legal parenthood should be addressed.  Lord Nicholls 
stated: 
‘In reaching its decision the court should always have in the mind that the 
ordinary way the rearing of a child by his or her biological parent can be 
expected to be in the child’s best interests … A child should not be removed 
from the primary care of his or her biological parents without good 
reason’.46   
 Lord Nicholls approach clearly states that there is a legal presumption in 
favour of biological parents unless there is sufficient reason otherwise.  Placing 
such importance upon gestational motherhood impacts negatively upon 
motherhood more broadly as the hierarchical tendency of the legal definition of 
‘mother’ implies that women who are social mothers are not in an equal legal 
position to their gestation/genetic counterparts.  This view is clearly in tension 
with the social reality of motherhood, particularly in cases where conflict does not 
arise.        
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 Due to the conflict between judicial opinions concerning the gestational 
‘mother’ role, it has lead to inaccurate reformulations of the ratio set out in this.  
Coombes comment on this decision noted: 
‘The judgment has reinforced the importance of the biological link between 
children and their parents.  While each case must be determined on its own 
facts – and compliance with court orders will be relevant – it appears that it 
will now be harder for a nonbiologically related person…to secure an order 
displacing a child from its biological parent’.47 
 This conclusion is ultimately guided by Lord Nicholls reasoning (and at 
times by Baroness Hale’s conflation of ‘natural’ and biological parenthood).  
However subsequent case law has, pleasingly, sought to clarify this legal position 
on presumption in favour of natural biological parents.   
2.8 After Re G: Subsequent Decisions  
 Kim Everett and Lucy Yeatman suggest that subsequent decisions following 
Re G demonstrate a judicial enthusiasm ‘for elevating the significance of the genetic 
link in determining welfare’.48  Cases such as Re A (Joint Residence: Parental 
Responsibility)49 and Re R (Residence)50 indicate a ‘move back to the restrictive 
notion of parenthood which excludes all but the genetic parent’.51  This highlights 
the impact of Lord Nicholl’s comments upon future judicial considerations, 
undermining the progressive approach taken by Baroness Hale in relation to 
‘natural’ parenthood.   
 Most recently, the Supreme Court case of Re B52 sought to clarify the legal 
position in Re G which explicitly states that there is no presumption in favour of 
natural parents.  This case is an example of the court ‘rowing back’53 from 
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subsequent misinterpretation of the decision in Re G and reaffirming the 
distinctions between ‘natural’ and legal parenthood outlined by Baroness Hale.  
The case of Re B is unusual and concerned a biological father and maternal 
grandmother.  Both father and grandmother sought to acquire parental 
responsibility which would allow the child to reside with them.  Upon appeal, 
residence was transferred to the child’s father.  Bainham notes that, 
‘Judge Richard was found by the Supreme Court to have misunderstood the 
decision in Re G and was led into a number of errors.  He had referred to 
‘the right of the child to be brought up in the home of his or her natural 
parents.  This, it was held, betrayed a failure on his part to concentrate on 
the factor of overwhelming – indeed, paramount – importance which is, of 
course, the welfare of the child.’54 
 The Supreme Court in Re B states that the lower courts in this case 
misinterpreted the decision in Re G.  The lower courts in this case followed Lord 
Nicholls’s additions to Baroness Hale’s leading judgment, overlooking her nuanced 
distinction between natural and legal parenthood.  Following Lord Nicholl’s 
remarks in Re G, the Court of Appeal in Re B opined that ‘the court should always 
bear in mind that, ordinarily, the rearing of a child by his biological parent could be 
expected to be in his best interest’.55  Lord Kerr in the Supreme Court took this 
opportunity to reaffirm and reiterate the key issues in Re G, in particular, the 
paramountcy of the child’s welfare consideration which should not be guided by a 
legal presumption in favour of a natural parent56.     
 This indicates how the courts face difficulty and can erroneously blend 
natural parenthood and legal parenthood.  Legal parenthood is distinct from 
natural parenthood and this is the issue which Baroness Hale was seemingly trying 
to make clear in Re G.  Overall, Re G is an example of how the courts have 
attempted to progress legal constructions away from hetero-normative ideals.  As 
Beresford notes, ‘natural’ [parenthood] was defined directly in terms of 
heterosexuality’ and thus for lesbian mothers, identification in law as a social 
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mother was a difficult process.  Separation of the ‘mother’ roles offers greater legal 
recognition to social parenting, in alignment with social attitudes towards 
motherhood.  However greater recognition in terms of legal status was not 
achieved in this case.  Everett and Yeatman argue that: 
 Re G ‘was a missed opportunity… [as] the effect of [Baroness Hale’s] 
discussion of the significance of natural parenthood along with the speeches 
of Lord Scott and Lord Nicholls led to a revival of the natural parent 
presumption, albeit blanketed in the language of the child’s welfare’.57 
 The House of Lords attempt to clarify legal motherhood ultimately reaffirms 
a traditional understanding of ‘natural’ motherhood as a woman who gives birth to 
a child which is at odds with the social reality of motherhood.   
2.9 Conflicting Constructions  
 To summarise, the societal understanding of motherhood is clear.  The 
meaning of motherhood is a subjective construct, open to interpretation and 
personal identification with the role of ‘mother’.  The legal understanding of 
motherhood is also explicitly clear.  Both, however, represent conflicting positions.  
The boundless societal response to motherhood is in contrast to the restrictive 
legal approach which sometimes confines motherhood to pregnancy.  Is this 
problematic?  What is the relevance of these conflicting positions?  Ultimately, why 
is it important that legal and social constructions of motherhood are in alignment?   
 Women’s identity is a central feminist concern and ‘[c]ritiquing the 
formation of women’s preferences and related ideas of autonomy have been 
recurring subjects in feminist scholarship’58.  It is therefore important that 
women’s chosen identity as mothers, or not, is acknowledged and respected in law 
through adequate legal regulation.  Ruddick observes that ‘[r]epresentations of 
mothers have a way of becoming, for mothers, representations of themselves’.59  In 
other words, representations of mothers and how women see themselves in this 
                                                             
57 n. 48 at 297 
58 n. 14  at 175 
59 S. Ruddick, ‘Thinking Mothers/Conceiving Birth’ in D. Bassin, M. Honey, M. M. Kaplan (eds), 
Representations of Motherhood (Yale University Press 1994) at 29 
33 
 
role are intrinsically linked.  Representation of motherhood as interchangeable in a 
social context encourages women to view themselves as mothers on their own 
terms.  Motherhood is represented by their actions and family form without 
restriction allowing self-identification as a mother.  However, a legally restrictive 
representation of motherhood (which is in conflict with the social representation) 
may confine women to view themselves only as mothers if they adhere to the 
hetero-normative ideal.  This undermines the importance of ‘mother’ roles 
different to gestation.  Because legal rights enable women to carry out their role of 
mother in a social context through parental responsibility it therefore follows that 
the legal representation of motherhood is the prevailing viewpoint.  As it is clearly 
problematic, the conflict between social and legal representation should be broken 
down to offer a united approach to motherhood. This enables women to self-
identify based upon their own choices and family structures, free from prescribed 
legal descriptions of ‘mother’.   
 However, to what extent is legal recognition of subjective motherhood a 
realistic, achievable aim?  First, Jill Marshall notes that ‘a woman’s decision to 
‘accept’ maternity, or at least to remain pregnant and give birth, but to refuse 
motherhood, is largely unexamined.’60  This is because for the majority, women’s 
experience as mothers comprises both pregnancy and mothering.  Non-normative 
accounts of motherhood thus remain on the periphery.   In addition to this, O’ 
Donovan notes that various stories of motherhood ‘range from natural instinct, to 
altruism or martyrdom, to self-interest, and unpicking these is difficult’.61  
However this is not reason enough to suggest that non-normative accounts of 
motherhood do not require further examination – in fact, the opposite is true.  
Further, non-normative motherhood and its recognition in law are particularly 
problematic in the context of assisted reproduction where the separation of 
biological ‘mother’ roles becomes ever more apparent.  This brave new world of 
assisted reproduction technologies highlights further areas for consideration when 
comparing the legal and social constructions of motherhood.    
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378 in n. 14 at 179 
34 
 
2. 10  A Brave New World: Assisted Reproduction 
 In 1978 the first ‘test tube baby’, Louise Brown, was born62.  Louise was 
conceived via in vitro fertilisation, a process whereby an egg (the ovum) is 
fertilised with sperm outside of the womb in a controlled environment, followed 
by the transference of the zygote to the female womb with the intention of 
procuring a successful pregnancy.  Louise’s birth marked the beginning of a 
scientific revolution in the realm of assisted reproduction.  The process of in vitro 
fertilisation permits women to donate their eggs to be fertilised and implanted into 
other women.  The primary consequence of IVF in the context of motherhood is 
that this assisted reproduction technique can separate genetic and gestational 
motherhood.   
 The definition of motherhood presented in this chapter enables an egg 
donor to self-identify as a mother as she has contributed to the creation of a child, 
regardless of whether she wishes to engage with social mothering.  However, the 
legal regulation of biological motherhood does not permit this.  An egg donor 
cannot be recognised as a legal mother by virtue of s. 47 HFE Act 2008 unless she 
goes on to adopt the child.  The egg donor is aware that she will have no parental 
rights or responsibilities and consents to this upon donation.  Richard Collier 
comments that ‘egg, sperm and embryo donors are not parents because the act of 
donation signals their clear intention not to become so.’63  However, this argument 
is questionable.  Do women who donate eggs view themselves as non-mothers 
because this is the construction presented in law?  Robin Mackenzie maintains that 
social acceptability of egg donation as distinct from motherhood has hinged upon 
analogies made with praiseworthy altruistic and socially valued activities such as 
blood or organ donation and medico-surgical procedures’.64  As a result of this, the 
legal starting points for gestational and biological mothers are very different.   
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 The different legal starting for gestational and donating biological mothers 
is not problematic when the egg donor does not choose to engage with the 
upbringing of the child and this is an autonomous decision.  However, when there 
is conflict between the genetic mother and the social mother, or even the genetic, 
gestational and social mother a legal framework which treats these differently is 
extremely problematic.  This is particularly the case for lesbian couples where one 
woman will contribute an egg to be carried by her partner.  Both women therefore 
carry out two separate ‘mother’ roles.   
 Conflict between these various mother roles may arise most obviously in 
the context of surrogacy.  Surrogacy arrangements may take one of two forms. 
Partial surrogacy involves the ova of the surrogate mother, and the sperm of either 
the commissioning male or a donor.  The surrogate’s egg is fertilised either 
through sexual intercourse or artificial insemination.  The surrogate therefore is 
the gestational and genetic mother and is recognised also as the legal mother.  Full 
surrogacy is the process whereby IVF is used to implant the egg and sperm of 
either a commissioning couple, or donors in to a surrogate.  The surrogate will 
therefore have no biological connection with the child that she is carrying.  Social 
mothering in the context of surrogacy is most commonly carried out by the 
intending mother who has commissioned the birth who may or not also be the 
biological mother.  The practice of surrogacy most obviously demonstrates the 
various ‘mother’ roles and how they are constructed in law and society.  Surrogacy 
explicitly utilises the various ‘mother’ roles carried out by several different women 
with the overall aim being to enable one woman to become a mother in a social 
capacity.  Surrogacy is an example of non-normative motherhood and is the 
antithesis to the traditional hetero-normative construction of motherhood as a 
gestational enterprise which is associated with maternal care.  Surrogacy is a long-
standing method of assisted reproduction, albeit rare65.  It is therefore important 
that non-normative forms of motherhood are also recognised in law and are 
constructed in light of social reality.    
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2. 11 Recognising Non-Normative Families 
 Martha McMahon observes that ‘[c]ultural meanings of 
motherhood...provide guiding metaphors not simply for the construction of 
identity but for the representation of idealized social bonds.  Motherhood 
symbolizes connectedness.’66  McMahon’s depiction of motherhood transcends the 
maternal-foetal bond and instead focuses on connection.  Motherhood centres 
upon connection between carer and child which may take place as part of the 
gestation process or post-birth through the act of mothering.  Motherhood should 
not be essentialised into two different categories of ‘biology’ and ‘social’ 
motherhood.  Motherhood currently regulated in terms of gestation and mothering 
as a continuous experience for women as is apparent in statute and common law, 
or as a social process whereby parental responsibility is awarded and not full legal 
title.  Although motherhood can be transferred, the transferral process is 
constructed in such a way that the non-normative mother is only recognised when 
the legal rights and recognition of another woman as a mother have been 
extinguished67.  Why must the law choose between types of mother?  It follows that 
due to a desire to choose one legal mother, and one only, the current legal 
understanding is in great tension with social motherhood.  In its attempt to restrict 
the family form, the current legal understanding attempts to inaccurately and 
ineffectively regulate mothers.  Legal motherhood in the first instance is not 
determined by relationships with other women or men and in the instance of 
assisted reproduction engaging with others is crucial to the creation of a child.  
This is particularly relevant in the context of surrogacy.  Social motherhood is 
determined by the choices of women.  This choice should be respected in law. In 
the event of surrogacy, parental responsibility is afforded to surrogates in the first 
instance, although their initial engagement with surrogacy indicates that they wish 
for the act of social mothering to be carried out by another person.  Surrogacy as a 
practice requires far greater legal and social attention due to its potential to 
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challenge traditional constructions of motherhood.  The legal regulation of 
surrogacy is pivotal when assessing the extent to which the law reflects the social 
reality of motherhood.  Surrogacy can therefore be used as a lens to rethink the 
legal recognition of mothers and mothering.   
2.12 Conclusion 
 Hetero-normative ideals continue to dominate the legal regulation of 
motherhood due to prevalent discourse surrounding biology.  Although societal 
understandings of motherhood are inclusive of non-normative mothers, the legal 
regulation of motherhood has a long way to go.  The misinterpretation of the 
decision in Re G by the Court of Appeal signifies current legal difficulty to separate 
the various mother roles and assess them on their own merit.  McMahon 
recognises that ‘the politics of motherhood extends beyond issues of reproductive 
choice’68 but the politics of motherhood should now be focussed explicitly upon the 
autonomy of women.   
 The hetero-normative legal response to motherhood overshadows 
reproductive choice, and attempts to impose its own definition of whom and what 
a mother should be and do.  The legal response to motherhood fails to effectively 
understand the differentiation between being a mother and the act of mothering.   
Assisted reproduction practices such as IVF or surrogacy theoretically provide 
women with greater choice as potential mothers, however the ‘politics of 
motherhood’ (the legal response) continues to hinder the reproductive 
experiences of women.   
 A family developed through assisted reproduction, or involving adoption or 
step-mothering is different to the traditional family unit consisting of one mother 
and one father.  The law should appreciate this difference and attempt to facilitate 
the changing family form to reflect social reality.  The legal approach to 
motherhood should utilise the experiences of women as mothers as its starting 
point when regulating motherhood in order to reflect the true social reality and 
diversity of motherhood.  This is particularly the case when non-normative 
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mothers (such as surrogacy mothers) subvert idealised stereotypes regarding 
maternity in order to prevent tension between law and society.  The law should 
work upwards from the experiences of women in order to provide an accurate 
regulatory system to regulate motherhood.  If social reality is not reflected in law, 
hetero-normative ideals reinforce gendered constructions of maternity impacting 
upon women’s ability to freely engage with motherhood.   
 Surrogacy and its regulation which facilitates the transferral of mother 
status highlights an area of law which can be assessed with a view to exposing the 
hetero-normative behaviour of law when faced with non-normative examples of 
motherhood.  Vanessa Munro argues that:  
To attend to context, in the way that the feminist ethical project demands, 
we must abandon the pursuit of polarised premises and commence a search 
for mechanisms that afford the greatest amount of respect and credibility to 
the wishes expressed by individual women.69 
 Examination of the legal regulation of surrogacy will help to expose and 
abandon hetero-normative ideals which balance social motherhood against the 
importance of biological motherhood.  Motherhood achieved through surrogacy 
rejects the polarised premises of traditional conceptualisations and offers a way 
forward to reconsider legal motherhood.  
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3.  THE LEGAL REGULATION OF SURROGACY 
3.1 Introduction 
The social construction of motherhood details a broad understanding of who a 
mother is and what she does.  This wide-ranging construction of motherhood 
should be reflected in law.  In order to assess whether the multi-faceted nature of 
motherhood is reflected in law, surrogacy and its regulation will be used as lens 
through which to outline the legal response to motherhood.  Surrogacy is used as it 
most obviously distinguishes the various ‘mother’ roles outlined in Chapter One.  
Further, the voluntary organisation Surrogacy UK reports that there have been 
over 700 successful births since 1985 and is a popular reproductive method within 
the ever-growing realm of assisted reproduction.1 The social relevance of 
surrogacy is therefore important in assessing the relationship between law and 
motherhood.   
 This chapter will outline the feminist and societal response to surrogacy to 
provide a contextual background to current legal regulation.  It will then 
specifically analyse and critique the acquisition and transfer of legal motherhood 
within the context of surrogacy.  Utilising statutory provisions and case law, it will 
emphasise current issues and problems with surrogacy regulation.  It will argue 
that current tensions between law and society are a consequence of a hetero-
normative response to motherhood.  This hetero-normative response creates legal 
obstacles and challenges for non-normative mothers who wish to assume or 
relinquish motherhood.  This typically involves those who are aided by assisted 
reproduction methods, and more specifically in the context of surrogacy.  It will be 
argued that the current legal position reflects a fixed, specific hetero-normative 
understanding of mothers and as a result of this does not reflect the social reality 
of motherhood specifically in the context of surrogacy.  The legal construction of 
mothers represents an idealised, essentialist understanding: mothers are women 
who are driven by their innate maternal instinct to care and nurture the offspring 
that they have given birth to.  As a result of this, the various ‘mother’ roles are not 
reflected in law and reform is required.  This chapter will conclude that a holistic 
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model of motherhood should be adopted within surrogacy law and this can only be 
achieved if surrogacy law radically reformed.   
3.2  Early Societal Response to Surrogacy 
 Surrogacy as a practice is neither new nor radical.  Susan Fischer and Irene 
Gillman comment that ‘[t]he practice of using a surrogate biological mother dates 
back to the time if the Old Testament (Genesis 16:2).’2 However, it was not until the 
1980s that surrogacy was firmly placed upon the feminist and political agenda due 
to development of IVF and new reproductive technologies.  At a time dominated by 
radical feminist thinking, feminist theories regarding surrogacy began to develop.  
Radical thinkers such as Catharine Mackinnon3, Andrea Dworkin4 and Carol 
Pateman5 perceived surrogacy as male control over the reproductive freedoms of 
women, likening the practice to “baby-farming” and exploiting women as 
“reproductive vessels”.  Pateman argued that surrogacy is used by men to provide 
their wives with ‘the gift’6 of a child.  This argument suggests that men effectively 
use surrogacy as a means to an end, the end being to satisfy the desire of another 
woman to have a child.  The male is perceived as the central actor in this 
potentially exploitative environment.  She compares surrogacy and prostitution, 
and argues that like prostitution, surrogacy is the use of a woman’s body 
‘contracted out for use by a man who fills it with his seed’.7  Lorraine Harding 
comments that comparisons between surrogacy and prostitution are easily 
identified: ‘Both appear to be an arrangement in which a woman “sells her body” in 
a way deemed more intimate and somehow more problematic than, say, the selling 
of muscle power as labour’.8  Early comparisons between surrogacy and 
prostitution highlight strong feminist concerns over surrogacy as a practice that 
could potentially exploit women’s bodies in a reproductive context.  As well as 
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claims that surrogacy is an example of patriarchal oppression, Judith Bourne and 
Caroline Derry argue that the practice of surrogacy exerts control over women’s 
bodies.  The authors argue a ‘surrogate mother will be affected throughout her 
body’ due to the common effects of pregnancy such as back pain and will also be 
subject to social scrutiny if she does not give up social habits such as smoking’.9 
Surrogacy is therefore conceived by some feminists as a form of control, however 
the affects of pregnancy suffered by a surrogate are no different to any other 
woman’s choice to become pregnant.   
 Despite a largely negative feminist reaction, there are ‘other feminist 
writers who champion choice and who maintain that surrogacy could be used to 
transform gender relations by potentially empowering women to use their 
reproductive capacity as they chose’10.  This discourse of ‘choice’ has been 
prevalent within the surrogacy debate from the outset and is relied upon by those 
who view surrogacy as an expression of reproductive autonomy.   
 Broader early societal response to surrogacy was largely negative in 
alignment with radical feminist views which claimed surrogacy was an expression 
of commercial exploitation where payment is involved.  Lorraine Harding 
comments that press reports in the 1970s and early 1980s detailing incidents of 
surrogacy were met with ‘public debate and concern, even outrage’,11 particularly 
when the surrogacy arrangement was commercial.  Public outrage was fuelled 
most aggressively by the case of Kim Cotton, otherwise known as Re C12.  The case 
of Kim Cotton concerned a surrogacy arrangement between an American couple 
and a British surrogate.  Kim Cotton was paid in her role as surrogate to the couple 
and this was exposed via the media13.  This led to the portrayal of the practice of 
surrogacy as a transatlantic ‘baby-selling business’ which required political and 
legal attention.   
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 In light of the Kim Cotton case, the lack of legal regulation for commercial 
surrogacy arrangements in particular was exposed.  Public outcry in response to 
the Cotton case was met with the commission of The Warnock Committee to 
examine legal and ethical issues presented by the scientific development of new 
reproductive technologies, primarily in vitro fertilisation which could be used 
within full surrogacy arrangements.  As a result of the development of IVF and its 
use within surrogacy, as well as heightened social concern about surrogacy as 
disruptive practice, it was now deemed to be a cause for ’public concern’14 which 
required the scrutiny of the Warnock Committee.  
3.3  The Warnock Report 
 Blyth remarks that ‘[t]he appointment of the Warnock 
Committee…provided the first opportunity for the formal acknowledgement of 
surrogacy as a major social issue in Britain.’15  The Warnock Committee’s response 
to the regulation of surrogacy would therefore be instrumental in shaping social 
and legal conceptualisation of surrogacy.  Referring to research carried out by 
Haimes, Blyth comments that ‘members held three perspectives on surrogacy’16.  
First, that surrogacy should be criminalised; second, that it should be left to 
professionals or; third, surrogacy should be removed from the exclusive control of 
professionals and subjected to similar regulatory systems as were being proposed 
for other fertility treatments.’17  However, the majority viewpoint was that 
surrogacy was inherently unacceptable.  As a result of this, the Warnock Report 
recommended that surrogacy arrangements should not be enforceable by law.  It 
was argued that, [t]here is little doubt that the Courts would treat most, if not all, 
surrogacy arrangements as contrary to public policy and therefore 
unenforceable.’18  Further, the committee was of the view that all commercial 
surrogacy arrangements should be prohibited in order to prevent the exploitation 
of surrogate mothers and the commodification of children.  It was believed that 
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‘baby-selling’ would inevitably follow if commercial surrogacy contracts were to be 
legally enforceable.  It was recommended that the involvement of criminal law 
would act as a deterrent to those who might become involved in commercial 
surrogacy as a business enterprise.’19  It was proposed that criminal sanctions 
should be placed upon those who attempt to advertise or promote surrogacy as a 
commercial enterprise.  However, the Warnock Committee were not entirely 
unanimous in their response to surrogacy.  Committee members raised dissenting 
concerns that the committee’s recommendations would leave future arrangements 
‘unsupported by medical and counselling services.’20  In sum, surrogacy was 
constructed in the Warnock Report as ‘morally and socially unacceptable’21 and 
was not legitimised through legislation.   
 Additionally, the Warnock Report’s consideration of surrogacy was 
tangential to a broad examination of human embryology.  It is therefore 
unfortunate that the Warnock Report’s response to surrogacy was to become the 
foundation of current legal regulation.  The Warnock Report’s viewpoint 
portraying surrogacy as inherently unacceptable within society was the impetus 
behind subsequent legislation which responds to surrogacy.  However, as Margaret 
Brazier notes the Warnock Committee’s ‘recommendations on surrogacy were only 
partially accepted by government and then hastily and ham-fistedly hurried 
through Parliament’22.  For example, the Warnock Report recommended that ‘[i]t 
be provided by statute that all surrogacy agreements are illegal contracts and are 
therefore unenforceable in the courts.’23  Whilst surrogacy arrangements are not 
currently enforceable in law, surrogacy arrangements are not illegal indicating a 
compromise position between the Warnock recommendations and current legal 
provision. 
 
3.4  Legal Background 
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 Several years later, the Surrogacy Arrangements Act (SAA) 1985 was 
enacted.  The objective of the SAA 1985 enacted as a result of the Warnock Report 
and public outcry to the Kim Cotton case, was to prohibit the practice of surrogacy 
from becoming a commercial enterprise.  This is effectively summarised by 
Jacqueline Priest: ‘[t]he government’s explicit intention was to deal swiftly with 
what was perceived to be the most repugnant manifestation of surrogacy’24 – that 
is, commercial surrogacy.  The SAA 1985 explicitly prohibits and imposes a blanket 
ban on commercial surrogacy.  Section 2 of the Act states that no person shall on a 
commercial basis initiate or take part in any negotiations regarding the surrogacy 
arrangement (s. 2 (1)(a)), offer or agree to negotiate (s. 2 (1)(b)), or compile any 
information with a view to negotiating a surrogacy arrangement (s. 2 (1)(c)).  
However, section 2 (2) states that no criminal offence shall be imposed on either 
the surrogate or the commissioning party should they enter into a commercial 
agreement in order to prevent association between the birth of a child and 
criminality.   The involvement of money within agreements is not entirely 
prohibited.  Reasonable expenses paid to the surrogate are permitted in order to 
reimburse any loss the surrogate may have incurred, for example, loss of earnings.  
The central purpose of the Act was therefore to prohibit the possibility of the 
commodification of childbirth.  However, while surrogacy arrangements may be 
lawful, they are not contractually enforceable.  As Shaun Pattinson notes, [t]he 
commissioning couple cannot sue for damages or performance, and the surrogate 
cannot sue for payment.  This legal vulnerability is intended to discourage 
surrogacy arrangements,’25 as desired by the Warnock Committee.    
 The SAA 1985 was effectively a symbolic piece of legislation, responding to 
social discomfort towards ‘baby-selling’ as evidenced by the feminist response to 
surrogacy as outlined earlier.  The legal parameters of the Act do not extend 
beyond commercial surrogacy and therefore altruistic arrangements remain 
unregulated.  In 1990, the SAA was incorporated into the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act (the HFE Act) 1990.  The HFE Act was the first regulatory 
instrument to govern human fertilisation and embryology.  The purpose of the Act 
is to control and monitor reproductive research and clinical practices.  As 
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surrogacy arrangements may utilise in vitro fertilisation or artificial insemination 
requiring a sperm donor, the practice is within the jurisdiction of the Act.  
However, a surrogacy agreement arranged within the private domain using the 
surrogate’s egg fertilised in vivo without the aid of medical assistance remains 
unregulated.  Ultimately, practice of surrogacy remains largely unregulated, 
despite an increase in popularity.26  The decision to allow surrogacy to remain 
unregulated signifies the discouragement of a complex peripheral reproductive 
method in favour of the hetero-normative family structure.  Surrogacy is thus 
regulated indirectly in the context of assisted reproductive medicine.  If the 
surrogacy arrangement does not incorporate medical treatment such as IVF, the 
arrangement is wholly unregulated.   
 Unlike the SAA 1985, the HFE Act 1990 (as amended by the HFE Act 2008) 
defines legal parentage and how parentage may be transferred when assisted 
reproductive methods are used.  In 2008, the HFE Act 1990 was subject to an 
extensive review process, because ‘it was never expected that the Act would 
remain unchanged in this area of fast-moving science’27 and ‘was faced with the 
challenges of trying to keep up with the fast past of change…also in respect of 
society’s expectations and demands.’28 Lord Darzi presenting the HFE Bill 2007 
before the House of Lords stated that the ‘aim in undertaking this review was to 
ensure that the law remained effective and fit for purpose in the 21st century.’29  
The practice of surrogacy, however, received very little attention.  As a result of the 
2008 reform, same-sex couples can now recognised in law as the legal parents of a 
child both in the context of IVF/donor insemination used by lesbian partnerships 
and surrogacy used by gay men to become biological parents.  However, in relation 
to default legal status as a mother, the legal framework remains unchanged.  The 
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gestational mother as outlined in Chapter One is the legal mother30.  No other 
mother is recognised as a default legal position, although parentage can be 
transferred (as will be discussed below).  This legal framework therefore only 
offers legal protection to surrogates who receive medical treatment and their 
associated commissioning party.  This is primarily because the surrogate is viewed 
as a patient whose interests should be protected throughout the course of 
treatment.  As the surrogate is receiving medical treatment, there is a clinical 
obligation to protect her interests.  This is evidenced by s. 27 of the HFEA Act 1990 
which states that the legal mother of the child is the gestational mother.  Excluding 
reasons for this based upon constructions of motherhood, the legal status of the 
surrogate is protected in her role as a patient.      
 The legal status of fathers however is not so clear in the context of 
surrogacy.  The surrogate’s husband does not typically contribute to the existence 
of the child, either biologically or socially, however - by virtue of marriage - the 
surrogate’s husband is the legal father of the child born through surrogacy.31  If the 
surrogate is married, the legal status of the commissioning male cannot be 
recognised even though he may be the biological father.  When the surrogate is not 
married, or her husband does not provide his consent, section 36 of the HFE Act 
applies ‘where no man is the father by virtue of s. 35 (i.e. there is no consenting 
husband) and no woman is the other parent by virtue of s. 42 (i.e. there is no 
consenting civil partner).’32  Under the agreed fatherhood provisions detailed in s. 
37 of the HFE Act 2008, where treatment is provided to a woman, a man may be 
treated as a legal father providing that both consent to this in writing.   
 The HFE Act 1990 (as amended by the 2008 Act) requires any desired 
treatment such as IVF as part of the surrogacy arrangement to be carried out by a 
licensed fertility clinic.  If a donor or the commissioning mother’s egg is used, IVF 
treatment must be carried out by a licensed clinic which is governed by the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority33  and its Code of Practice34.  It is 
                                                             
30 s. 27 HFE Act 1990 as amended by the 2008 Act 
31 Section 35-37 of the HFE Act 2008 outlines the fatherhood provisions.  Section 35 states that the 
husband of the surrogate is the legal father, but only if he willingly consents to her treatment.   
32 n. 25 at 305 
33 See <http://www.hfea.gov.uk> regarding the  Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, 
accessed 01 January 2011 
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important to note however that current government plans to abolish the HFE 
Authority are underway.  At the time of writing, it is suggested that the HFE 
Authority may be consumed by another regulatory body however this remains 
uncertain and does not require further discussion here35.  A licensed fertility clinic 
may provide treatment for a number of purposes in the context of surrogacy.  
Treatment may be provided using gametes, except when it is partner-donated 
sperm that has been neither processed nor stored (s. 4 (1) (b) HFE Act 2008) to 
allow the process of in vitro fertilisation.  Robin Mackenzie succinctly summarizes 
the criteria which must be satisfied in order for treatment to be carried: 
 ‘Where surrogacy involves IVF, it is subject under the Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority Code of Practice to quality control 
provisions over the sperm used, as well as to criteria for treatment and 
supervision by the clinic of hospital’s independent ethics committee, and is 
provided only after the welfare principle of the child-to-be, and the children 
of the gestational mother and those commissioning the pregnancy has been 
taken into account’.36 
 Treatment will only commence when significant consideration has been 
given to various factors.   For example, the welfare principle must be satisfied prior 
to the award of a treatment licence.  The welfare principle is effectively a best 
interests test and seeks to determine whether it would be in the best interests of 
the child to be cared for by those applying for treatment.  The HFEA’s Code of 
Practice provides guidance on how this test must applied in order to assess 
whether there is ‘a risk of significant harm or neglect to any child’ who is not yet 
born, or already in existence and in the care of the surrogate or the commissioning 
party.37  Factors to be taken into consideration to highlight any significant risk of 
harm include previous criminal convictions, mental or physical conditions, and a 
commitment to wellbeing and health of the child’.38  Further, section 13(5) HFE Act 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
34 HFEA, Code of Practice 8th ed http://www.hfea.gov.uk/3401.html  
35 See, Public Administration Committee - Fifth Report Smaller Government: Shrinking the Quango 
State (December 2010); V. Raper, ‘Leaked letter ‘proves’ fertility watchdog faces last bark’ BioNews 
(September 2010) <http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_71303.asp> accessed 01 January 2011  
36 n. 26 at 187-88 
37 n. 34 ‘Guidance Notes, The Welfare Principle’ para 8.3 
<http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/complete_CoP8.pdf > accessed 01 January 2011 
38 ibid at para 8.10, 8.11  
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1990 (as amended by s. 14 (2) (b) HFE Act 2008) states that the ‘need for 
supportive parenting’ must also be taken in to account.  This amendment, replacing 
the consideration of ‘the need for a father’, broadens the scope of the Act to be 
inclusive of same-sex couples and their desire to have a family.  John Sentamu 
argued that the government placed the ‘right to be a parent over the welfare of the 
child’39 through its amendment of the welfare principle.  However, a move away 
from the hetero-normative family structure represents a greater understanding of 
the welfare of the child and reflects progressive societal attitudes towards non-
normative families.   
 On the other hand, the welfare principle and how the welfare of the child is 
assessed is in itself not without criticism.  Emily Jackson’s work reflects critically 
upon the welfare principle, raising questions such as: ‘How could it be possible to 
base a decision upon whether to try to bring a child into the world upon 
assessment of that child’s best interests?’40  Jackson’s argument implies that the 
welfare principle is nonsensical, as we cannot know what would be in the best 
interests of that child as it simply does not exist.  In order to determine the best 
interests of a non-existent child, presumptive moral judgements must be made 
with regard to what would be in the best interests of the child should that child 
exist?  Further, Jackson adds: ‘Infertility clinicians do not receive training in 
addressing future parenting ability and nor will they have access to the sort of 
detailed information that might be necessary to make such a complicated 
assessment’41 emphasising the disingenuity of the welfare test.  It is not contested 
here that the welfare of a child should be a primary consideration when awarding 
a treatment licence, however an improved welfare test is required if the test to 
function adequately instead of acting as an arbitrary mechanism used 
discriminately against those who wish to cannot carry out reproductive decisions 
within the private sphere.  Jackson argues, 
 ‘[m]onitoring these exceptional personal choices in order to identify 
ill-judged or improper conception decisions would be unreservedly 
                                                             
39 A. Blackburn-Starza, ‘Lords criticise proposals to remove the ‘need for a father’ BioNews 
(November, 2007) <http://www.bionews.org.uk/page_13244.asp> accessed 01 January 2011  
40 E. Jackson, ’Rethinking the preconception welfare principle’ in K. Horsey, H. Biggs, Human 
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condemned as an unacceptably intrusive abuse of state power if the welfare 
principle was applied to  those couples who were able to conceive without 
the aid of reproductive treatment’.42 
 In relation to surrogacy, this argument extends further.  The best interests 
test is applied only to those who seek medical treatment as part of the agreement.  
Arrangements which do not involve medical intervention are unregulated and are 
not placed under the scrutiny of the test.  This suggests that there is now a two-tier 
system of regulation.  Uncomfortable social response to surrogacy led to legislation 
which chose not to recognise surrogacy.  The legislative response to surrogacy 
aimed to discourage this process, however surrogacy legislation could not be 
avoided in the context of medical treatment. Moreover, this inconsistency of legal 
regulation renders the welfare principle ineffective in its aim to protect the best 
interests of the child as not all arrangements are monitored.  The welfare principle 
requires further consideration.  Greater training should be offered to clinicians and 
the application of the best interests tests need to be re-examined.  At present, the 
best interests test monitors non-normative families who seek medical 
reproductive treatment.  Those who do not require medical treatment and make 
decisions within the private sphere akin to the hetero-normative family structure 
remain unregulated, highlightsing an adequate yet unclear legal framework. As a 
result of this, the HFE Act 1990 has undergone considerable scrutiny, both in 1998 
and more recently in 2008.  The Brazier Report in 1998, similar to the Warnock 
Report in 1984 will now be considered to access the impact of the SAA 1985 and 
HFE Act 1990 and the criticisms received.    
3.5 The Brazier Report  
 The Brazier Committee sought to examine the existing law on surrogacy, 
questioning whether the law protected the best interests of the child born as part 
of an agreement, and whether the interests of the surrogate, her family and those 
of the commissioning couple were protected43.  Emily Jackson observes that 
‘[w]hile undoubtedly less hostile to surrogacy than the Warnock Committee, the 
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Brazier Committee were nevertheless again concerned that regulation should not 
appear to either endorse or encourage the practice of surrogacy’44.  The Brazier 
Report made several recommendations with regard to a new Surrogacy Act, some 
of which were to limit the payments to surrogate mothers to only ‘genuine 
expenses, and to provide a new Code of Practice for surrogacy arrangements45.  
Michael Freeman argues that, ‘[t]he Report fails to appreciate that withdrawing 
renumeration from surrogates will only drive potential surrogates into an invisible 
and socially uncontrolled world where the regulators will be more like pimps than 
adoption agencies’46.  At the time of the Brazier Report, the legal position on 
surrogacy is clear.  Commercial surrogacy is strictly prohibited and as evidenced 
by Freeman’s commentary, continues to be an area of continual contention and 
debate.   Altruistic surrogacy is, and should remain unregulated unless the 
surrogacy arrangement involves medical assisted reproduction which is regulated 
by the HFE Act 1990.  The Brazier Report clarifies this position, noting that 
altruistic surrogacy is the only form of acceptable surrogacy and regulation is not 
required unless assisted reproductive methods are involved.  Altruistic surrogacy 
presently guides current regulation, in particular, the transferral of motherhood 
from the surrogate to the intending mother.  The transferral of motherhood in 
surrogacy law will now be examined in order to assess whether social and legal 
constructions of motherhood are in harmony or conflict.     
3.6 The Transferral of Motherhood 
 The altruistic model of surrogacy presented in law can be seen most 
obviously through assessment of the parenthood provisions which outline who can 
be recognised as a legal mother and father.  Prior to the enactment of the HFE Act 
1990, adoption was the primary route by which the commissioning couple could 
obtain legal parenthood of the child, transferring legal status from the gestational 
mother to the intending social mother.  However, surrogacy is different to 
adoption in many ways.  Surrogacy is pre-emptive as the birth is commissioned on 
the basis that the gestational mother will transfer her legal rights and 
responsibilities from the outset.  Additionally, at least one member of the 
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commissioning party will also usually have a biological relationship with the child.  
In response to this, parental orders, regulated by section 30 of the HFE Act 1990 
(as amended by section 54 of the HFE Act 2008) offer an alternative route.  Gamble 
and Ghevaert observe that essentially ‘[a] parental order acts like an adoption 
order, extinguishing the parental responsibility of the surrogate parents and 
conferring full legal parenthood on the commissioning parents’.47  A parental order 
permits re-registration of the child’s birth and is only awarded if a series of 
conditions are satisfied.  Under the HFE Act 2008 amendments, section 54 outlines 
how the commissioning party may acquire legal status.  First, the provision states 
that an application may be made by two people for a parental order if: 
a) the child has been carried by a woman who is not one of the applicants, as a 
result of an embryo or sperm and eggs being placed in her or her artificial 
insemination (s. 54 (1)(a)) 
b) the gametes of at least one of the applicants were used to bring about the 
creation of the embryo (s. 54(1)(b), and 
c) the conditions in subsections (2) to (8) are satisfied. 
These conditions state that the applicants must either be husband and wife (s. 54 
(2) (a)), or civil partners (s. 54(2) (b)) or must be living as partners in an enduring 
family relationship (s. 54) (2) (c))48.  Further, the applicants must apply for a 
parental order within 6 months of the child’s birth (s. 54 (3)), the child’s home 
must be with the applicants (s. 54 (4)(a)), and at least one of the applicants must 
be domiciled  in the United Kingdom, Channel Islands or Isle of Man (s. 54(4)(b)).   
 The court must also be satisfied that both the woman who carried the child 
and any other person who is a legal parent of the child ‘have freely, and with full 
understanding of what is involved, agreed unconditionally to the making of the 
order’ (section 54(6)(a)(b)).  However, section 54(7) states that if the agreement 
to the order is given by the gestational female less than six weeks after the child’s 
birth, the agreement is ineffective.  This period of six weeks is presumably a 
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‘cooling off’ period which provides the surrogate with sufficient time to ensure that 
she wishes to relinquish her parental rights and responsibilities.  However, in the 
majority of surrogacy arrangements the surrogate’s intention to relinquish her 
parental rights is demonstrated prior to conception.  It therefore appears 
nonsensical to impose this condition and undermines the choices of the surrogate 
to engage with gestational motherhood only.  In keeping with the altruistic model 
of surrogacy represented by the SAA 1985, the parental order provisions are 
clearly developed the notion that the surrogate is fulfilling the role of gestational 
mother as a ‘gift’.  Parental orders allow her time to renege on the agreement 
without recognising her original intentions to relinquish motherhood.  This is an 
example of legal hetero-normative tendencies which prescribe that gestational 
motherhood is synonymous with social motherhood although social constructions 
of motherhood reject this.   
 Further, section 54(8) holds that the court must be satisfied that no money 
or benefit (excluding reasonable expenses incurred) has been given or received by 
the applicants for or in consideration of the making of the order (s. 54(8)(a)), any 
agreement required by subsection (6) (s. 54(8)(b)), the handing over of the child 
to the applicants (s. 54(8)(c)), or the making of arrangements with the view to the 
making of the order, unless authorised by the court (s. 54(8)(d).  Adoption and 
parental orders transfer legal parentage when the surrogacy arrangement is not 
contested.  However, when the parental order conditions are not satisfied or the 
agreement is contested, the transferral of legal parenthood is far more 
problematic.  Section 54(8) is relevant here as the majority of cases which come 
before the courts concern parental orders and payments made to surrogates.  If the 
commissioning party do not meet the conditions of the parental order process, 
their only route to legal parenthood is adoption even if a biological relationship 
between parent and child is present.  Further, if payment has been made adoption 
will be also be prevented as any payment involved in the process is prohibited. 
Adoption orders are typically used to transfer legal status to a parent who had no 
involvement in the conception of the child.  Adoption as the only available route to 
legal parenthood even where a biological relationship is present as a result of 
surrogacy highlights the inadequacies of surrogacy law to effectively regulate 
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arrangements.  If the commissioning party are not able to acquire legal title or 
parental responsibility either by parental order or adoption, a child may become a 
ward of court in which it is then within the jurisdiction of the court to determine 
who will be recognised as the legal mother.  A child may be made a ward of court if 
a residence order is applied for.  A residence order may be sought by virtue of 
section 8 of the Children Act 1989 and is ‘an order settling the arrangements to be 
made as to the person with whom a child is to live’ (s. 8 (1)).  Unlike adoption and 
parental orders, a residence order transfers only parental responsibility and the 
right to make a claim to care for the child.   
 In summary, the statutory legal position on motherhood is limited.  Beyond 
identifying the legal mother and the introduction of legal mechanisms to transfer 
legal motherhood, the legal framework in the context of surrogacy is sparse.  Most 
obviously, the legal framework outlined so far highlights that the SAA 1985 and the 
HFEA 1990 and 2008 Acts do not recognise the various ‘mother’ roles within 
surrogacy equally.  The role of the social mother and her intentions to become a 
legal mother are not included in the current legal framework although it is she who 
will eventually hold legal status.  The common law position on the transferral of 
motherhood will be addressed to compare the statutory and judicial approach.  
Notably, case law in surrogacy concerns conflict of interest cases, typically 
between various mothers.  An examination of the case law in the area of surrogacy 
will detail explicitly the legal construction of motherhood in the context of 
surrogacy.     
3.7 Case Law – Contested Surrogacy Arrangements 
 The majority of surrogacy arrangements are not contested.49  There have 
only been a ‘handful’50 of failed surrogacy arrangements which have made their 
way to the courts51.  However this does not suggest that unsuccessful 
arrangements are necessarily rare.  It may be the case that where a surrogacy 
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arrangement fails, the parties involved rarely invoke the aid of the legal system, 
particularly when surrogacy is carried out in the home and legal parenthood is not 
transferred.  A small number of cases means that failed arrangements are not 
commonly presided over but unfortunately common law developing in this area is 
helping to shape legal and social reaction towards surrogacy.  This small number of 
cases has been the catalyst for hyped media attention surrounding surrogacy 
creating a complex relationship between law, media and reproductive decisions.  
In this section, each of these cases will be discussed in turn in order to assess 
judicial reaction to surrogacy and motherhood broadly conceived.  Case law details 
how motherhood is transferred in practice and how the law attempts to deal with 
multiple mother scenarios.  This section will seek to address the following 
questions: when there is conflict between various parties wishing to assume legal 
motherhood in the context of surrogacy, is there a judicial consensus on how this 
should be addressed? How far have the views of judges changed over time?  Do 
judicial perspectives of surrogacy reflect the broader societal response to 
surrogacy?     
 Early examples of surrogacy case law include Re P52.  This case concerned a 
surrogate who gave birth to twins as part of a surrogacy arrangement using the 
commissioning male’s sperm.  Post-birth, the surrogate’s intentions changed and 
she no longer wished to relinquish her parental rights and responsibilities.  
Although the commissioning male was the biological father, he was not 
automatically recognised as the legal father with a right to challenge the 
surrogate’s status as she was married. The commissioning couple sought to have 
the children made wards of court in order for the court to assess who should be 
awarded custody of the twins.  It was held that the twins should remain with their 
gestational, biological mother - the surrogate.  As with any wardship case the court 
held that, ‘the first and paramount consideration’53 was the best interests of the 
child.  It was found to be in the children’s best interest to remain with their 
gestational mother, ‘preserving the link with the mother to whom they are 
bonded’54.  However, as a gestational mother is the only person within the 
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surrogacy arrangement with full legal capacity, she maintains the right to develop 
a bond with the child over all other ‘mother’ types post-birth.  This decision 
establishes that it is almost always in the child’s best interest to remain with its 
gestational mother because as Mary Hibbs comments, ‘[t]o compel a woman who 
has carried and given birth to a child to hand over that child to the commissioning 
parents would be unacceptable.’55   
 Early examples of surrogacy case law and indeed most current examples 
demonstrate a presumption in favour of the surrogate if she no longer wishes to 
relinquish her parental rights.  Cases such as A v C56 and most recently CW v 
NT57both held that it was in the best interests of the child to remain with the 
surrogate, the gestational mother.  Although these cases are fact-based decisions 
and do not set a precedent, the constructions of motherhood which they present 
are worrying.  Gamble and Ghevaert comment that ‘[t]his decision was based on 
the close attachment formed between the surrogate (and biological) mother and 
the baby…and the risk of emotional harm if the baby was moved into the care of 
the intended parents in the stark manner the intended parents proposed.’58 The 
central issue here is that if the surrogate originally intended to relinquish her 
rights, why was bonding between mother and daughter allowed to ensue?  This 
attachment between mother and child clearly developed post-birth in this case and 
is facilitated by the current legal approach which provides the surrogate with 
parental responsibility and legal title as a mother as a default starting point.  As a 
result of this, the commissioning parents begin the legal path to parenthood in a 
disadvantaged position.   This demonstrates the hetero-normative structure of the 
legal regulation of surrogacy as it reveres gestational motherhood and upholds its 
importance much to the ignorance of the commissioning party’s involvement in the 
conception of the child.     
  Further, how the best interests of the child are determined must also be 
questioned.  Eric Blyth argues that ‘conventional assumptions about the ‘ideal’ 
environment for child-rearing, based on theological doctrine and the stereotype of 
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the contemporary, white, westernied middle class nuclear family, result in the 
denial of parental aspirations to those who do not conform to the norm.’59  If the 
best interests of the child are influenced by idealised norms, non-normative 
mothers such as the intending social mother will be treated differently in law.  This 
suggests that the way in which the best interests test is executed requires reform, 
rethinking and incorporating ideas surrounding the contemporary family unit.  
The best interests test should reflect the social reality of familial relationships. 
 In the case of Re N (A Child)60 it was found that it was in the best interests of 
the child to reside with the commissioning party. This unusual case challenged the 
legal portrayal of the gestational mother role as superior to all other mother roles.  
The case concerned a surrogacy arrangement founded upon deception.  Mrs P, the 
gestational mother of child N entered into a sham surrogacy arrangement with a 
family, the J’s.  Mrs P never held any intention to part with the child conceived with 
the sperm of Mr SJ and wished to fulfil the social mother role.  The J’s believed that 
they were entering into a typical surrogacy arrangement in which Mrs P would 
relinquish her parental rights and responsibilities.  Mrs P informed the J’s that she 
had miscarried however they eventually became aware of the birth of N.  The J’s 
sought to challenge the legal status of Mrs P as a mother and wished to gain 
responsibility as the main carers of N.   
 At first instance, Coleridge J awarded parental responsibility in favour of the 
J’s.  The P family appealed against the transference of parental responsibility which 
the Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed.  The Court of Appeal argued that the 
appeal in question was ‘almost impossible to advance’61 and its only purpose being 
to ‘bring to a final conclusion the contest between rival options.’62  The case was 
heard and decided upon with great speed in order to settle the future of N, 
protecting his best interests.   
 In his leading judgment, Thorpe LJ drew upon the earlier judgment of 
Coleridge J, in which he stated ‘[t]he fact that both families constitute one of the 
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child’s natural parents means that both sides start from the position, neither side 
being able to claim that their blood ties should favour their claim.’63  Thorpe LJ’s 
approach, balancing the claims of the gestational mother and commissioning party, 
challenges the hierarchical ladder of mother roles which elevates the position of 
the gestational mother.  However, other common law decisions such as Re G64 
suggest that the surrogate’s legal claim to care for the child is greater than those of 
the commissioning couple placing great emphasis upon the gestational process 
which secures the initial legal title of the surrogate.65  The presumption that it is 
almost always in the best interests of the child to remain with his or her 
gestational mother due to issues of attachment and maternal-foetal bonding are 
given less weight in this case, taking into consideration the method of conception, 
the intentions of the commissioning party and the actions of Mrs P.   
 The Court of Appeal’s decision to sustain the award of parental 
responsibility in favour of the J’s was influenced by the fact that the P family had 
‘deliberately embarked upon a path of deception, driven by Mrs P’s compulsive 
desire to bear a child.’66  Coupled with the unstable setting of the P family, it was 
decided to be in the child’s best interest to be placed in the care of the J family.  
However, it was explicitly stated by Coleridge J that the application in favour of the 
J’s had ‘nothing whatever to do with penalising the P’s for breaking their 
agreement...or...their deliberate deception.’67   
 It must also be noted that as Mrs P was the legal mother and she was 
married, the legal father of the child is Mrs P’s husband by virtue of the fatherhood 
provisions within the HFE Act 1990 (as discussed previously).  As a result of this, 
the J family had no legal right to challenge the legal parenthood of the Ps.  Why, 
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therefore, was this matter for the courts?68  Presumably it was due to the unusual 
nature of the case and the biological relationship between Mrs SJ and N.  It would 
have been unreasonable to deny leave to apply for a residence order and therefore 
the courts had to adopt a pragmatic approach to the instance before them.  
Further, as this case was not technically a matter for the courts irrespective of the 
method of conception, or the biological relationship between the child and the 
intending social father, suggests that the current legal system fails to address the 
practice of surrogacy adequately.  Or, put another way, the fact that this was not 
automatically a matter for the court is a cause for concern in itself as conflict 
between parental figures would not be in the child’s best interests.   
 The child’s best interests must remain as the central focus for all cases 
concerning surrogacy disputes.   This view is affirmed by Callman J’s comments in 
Re MW69.  Discussed in Samantha Ashenden’s feminist judgment of Re N, ‘Callman J 
held in favour of the adoption of a child born as a result of a surrogacy 
agreement…on the grounds that the residential status quo with the commissioning 
couple provided amply for this his welfare.’70  However to determine the welfare 
interests of the child, greater legal attention should be paid to the intentions of the 
parties to care for the child in the courts formulation of what is in the best interests 
of the child.  Re MW establishes strong support for the ‘continuity of care with early 
caretakers’71 but because the surrogate in law is the default legal person with 
parental responsibility, she is established in her role as early caretaker upon the 
conception of the child.  This is in contrast to the legal position of the social mother 
who cannot acquire parental responsibility to legally engage with caretaking until 
the surrogate’s rights are awarded in her favour.  This exposes conflict between 
the legal construction of motherhood as a gestational mother who is legally 
provided for in terms of her social relationship with the child and the social 
context of surrogacy arrangements.  As in the majority of cases the surrogate will 
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not contest her parenthood as she does not intend to be recognised as a mother, 
enabling her as the legal default in terms of maternal care is at odds with the social 
reality of surrogacy and subsequently plays out awkwardly in the courts creating 
disparity between the mother roles.   
 To a certain extent, the case of Re N has unbalanced the status quo and 
points towards greater recognition of all parties involved in surrogacy.  The focus 
has now shifted from the exploitation of the surrogate and her legal position as 
gestational mother to the commissioning party and other mother roles as a result 
of the unusual facts of the case.  As a result of this, this case challenges assumptions 
about motherhood and the supposed altruistic face of surrogacy,   Pattinson 
comments that ‘[e]thical division is amplified by the reality that few surrogates act 
for altruistic reasons – surrogacy is not necessarily the personification of virtue 
ethics’72 - and the case of Re N emphasises the difficulties which may arise due to 
the idealised legal construction of surrogacy as pure altruism.  In addition, this 
case conceptualised ‘good’ and ‘bad’ mothers.  Mrs P is constructed as a ‘bad’ 
mother due to her deceptive behaviour which is is evidenced by the removal of 
Baby N from her care.  This adds a further area for consideration when assessing 
the legal construction of motherhood.  Mothers must also conform to ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ ideals surrounding motherhood to be recognised in a legal capacity.    The 
role of ‘mother’ in this case was assessed in terms of how the legal mother is 
‘mothering’, that is , whether she is acting or has acted as a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ mother.  
In this case, Mrs P and her deceptive actions detach her from the construction of 
‘mother’.  Hetero-normative ideals about the role of mother and its attachment to 
good mothering are reinforced further, placing the gestational mother once more 
at the top of the hierarchical ladder of mother roles.   
 To prevent this and also to avoid the courts entering into subjective 
discourse about ‘good’ and ‘bad’ mothers, where surrogacy agencies are used it 
should be ensured that all parties involved in the surrogacy are screened in order 
to protect their interests, and that of the child, prior to conception.  This point 
expressed in the case of CW v NT73 suggest that increased legal involvement 
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through the regulation of surrogacy agencies could ensure that the backgrounds 
and suitability to engage with surrogacy are monitored and are available to 
provide support.  A key failing of the current legal scheme is that through a lack of 
legal interaction with surrogacy, very little is known about its effects.  To improve 
surrogacy regulation overall, greater research in to the impact of surrogacy upon 
the child, surrogate and commissioning party should be carried out.  This will 
ensure that legal regulation is guided by the lived experiences of all involved and is 
paramount in achieving effective regulation.   
3.8 Case Law - Non-Contested Surrogacy Arrangements 
 In contrast to judicial consideration of contested cases, there has been an 
abundance of non-contested cases that have come before the courts due to the 
criteria that must be satisfied in order to transfer legal parenthood away from the 
surrogate.  Prior to the enactment of the HFE Act 1990, in the case of Re Adoption 
Application74 ‘it was held that a surrogacy arrangement would not contravene the 
Adoption Act 1976 so long as the payments made did not constitute an element of 
profit or financial reward’75.  Similarly, after the enactment of the HFE Act 1990, it 
was held in the case of Re Q76 it was held that payments could be sanctioned 
retrospectively provided that this payment was reasonable’77.  However, case law 
surrounding payments and parental orders has evolved to a state which now also 
permits payments which exceed what is reasonable, as was found in the case of Re 
L78.  Hedley J in this case opines that non-reasonable payments may be sanctioned 
as the Human Fertilisation and Embryology (Parental Order) Regulations 201079 
‘import into s. 54 applications the provisions of s. 1 of the Adoption and Children 
Act 2002’ which states that that the court’s paramount consideration is the child’s 
welfare80.  Under the previous 1994 Regulations the child’s welfare was a first but 
not paramount consideration.  The places public policy concerns regarding 
commercial surrogacy as a secondary factor in relation to the child’s welfare.  
                                                             
74 (Adoption: Payment)1987] 2 F. L. R. 291 
75 n. 55 at 565 
76 (Parental Order) [1996] 1 F. L. R 369 
77 ibid ~ Johnson J at374 
78 (A Child) (Surrogacy: Parental Order) [2010] EWHC 3146 (Fam) 
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Whilst this should be the correct approach, this renders surrogacy regulation and 
s. 54 of the HFE Act ineffective.  There is seemingly no justification beyond 
providing guidelines to couples who enter into surrogacy arrangements about 
what they should and should not do if the actions of the party are almost always 
rubber-stamped by the courts.  There is no incentive to adhere to the current legal 
structure as legal protection is not offered to recognise the legal interests of the 
parties involved in surrogacy arrangements.  Surrogacy is only partially regulated 
by law where the arrangement is commercial; however now, even when the 
arrangement is commercial the transferral of parenthood is not prohibited.  The 
issue is not that excessive surrogacy payments should not be sanctioned where 
this is in the child’s best interests, the issue is that the foundations of surrogacy 
law have been broken down and at present, the legal regulation is achieving very 
little.     
 The impact of this is that the legal construction of motherhood which 
facilities transferral of parental rights thus reflecting the socially shared 
experience of motherhood within surrogacy is hindered because the process is so 
difficult.  This is evidenced by the large number of cases where surrogacy 
payments have been made and also in the event of overseas surrogacy 
arrangements.  Most notably, the case Re X and Y81  concerned issues surrounding 
the location of the commissioning party.  In Re X and Y the surrogacy arrangement 
was between a couple residing in the UK and a Ukrainian surrogate.  In this case, 
Ukrainian and UK law were in opposing positions concerning the legal status of the 
parents of the twins born through the surrogacy arrangement.  UK law recognised 
the Ukrainian surrogate as the legal mother and the biological commissioning 
father retained neither parental responsibility nor legal title as a parent because 
the surrogate was married.  Gamble and Ghevaert note that ‘[h]ad the surrogate 
mother been unmarried, the twins would have been neither parentless nor 
stateless since their British biological father would have been treated as their legal 
father’.82  Hedley J found it was in the best interests of the child for a parental order 
to be granted in spite of lack of legal recognition of the commissioning party as 
parents.  Difficult parenthood provisions which construct the surrogate as the 
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default legal mother led to Hedley J’s conclusion that ‘the path to parenthood has 
been less a journey along a primrose path, more a trek through a thorn forest’.83    
3. 9  A United Position?   
 To summarise, the legal response to surrogacy recognises non-normative 
families and transfers motherhood accordingly.  However, the response to non-
normative motherhood founded upon hetero-normative understandings 
culminates in a difficult legal situation.  To what extent does the legislator’s 
response, surrogacy case law, and surrogacy in practice co-operate effectively?  
Are there any tensions/conflicts? 
 When there is no conflict, motherhood is transferred and the intentions of 
the party are ‘rubber-stamped’ by the courts in best interests of the child.  Where 
there is conflict, the gestational mother will most often maintain her parental 
rights due to hetero-normative understandings of motherhood which frames ‘best’ 
as ‘biological parenthood’ in the form of gestation in order to determine the best 
interest of the child.   
 Gamble and Ghevaert observe that, ‘English law allows and supports 
surrogacy if it fits the model deemed acceptable: altruistic, non-commercial, 
consenting and privately arranged’84 and is perhaps why the law remains 
unchanged by reform.  However, altruistic surrogacy presents further problems, 
particularly in terms of identifying ‘mother’ roles.  If surrogacy is to operate on a 
purely-altruistic basis it is more likely that arrangements will be made with those 
who are known to the commissioning couple, such as family members.  This means 
then that a family member may gestate the child (and will be the legal mother) but 
will go on to fulfil another family role.  This highlights the difficulty with rigid legal 
definitions of motherhood when socially these difficulties are largely absent.     
 It is evident then that there are tensions between the law and society in the 
context of surrogacy.  The social reality of surrogacy incorporates several women 
each contributing equally to the creation and/or upbringing of a child, however the 
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84 N. Gamble, L. Ghevaert, ‘The Chosen Middle Ground: England, Surrogacy Law and the 
International Arena’ [2009] International Family Law Journal at 237 
63 
 
law opts to choose only one of these women as the person who holds legal rights 
and responsibilities greater than all others within the arrangement.   
3. 10 Critique - The Uneasy Road to Legal Motherhood 
 At present, the current legal situation is particularly unclear.  Surrogacy is 
governed by three statutes, the SAA 1985, the HFE Act 1990, and the Act’s 2008 
amendments.  As a result of this, understanding the law is difficult, both in 
understanding and in practice.  How effective is the current regulation?  Do current 
legal mechanisms offer a straight forward route to legal motherhood within the 
context of surrogacy, protecting the best interests of all involved?  
 Recent reform signifies a step forward in terms of recognising the hetero-
normative preferences within the HFE Act 1990.  Prior to April 2010, transfer of 
the legal status from the legal mother to same-sex couples who utilise surrogacy 
was limited to the process of adoption by virtue of ss. 50 and ss. 144 (4) of the 
Adoption and Children Act 2002 if the couple are civil partners.  Post April 2010, 
legal parentage for same-sex couples may now be obtained via parental order due 
to the agreed female parenthood and fatherhood provisions.  Parentage may be 
transferred to same-sex couples, however only one member of this party will be 
recognised as a mother or father.  The other parent will be recognised as a ‘parent’.  
The extension of the application of parental orders permits two male partners or 
two female partners to be registered on a child’s birth certificate as the legal father 
and parent.  Further, a female civil partner or unmarried female partner could 
acquire legal parentage through her partner if she has contributed her egg within 
IVF or a surrogacy arrangement.  This then places all commissioning couples, 
regardless of sex, sexuality or marital status in the same legal position to apply for 
a parental order.  This highlights a significant move away from the hetero-
normative foundations of the HFE Act 1990.  In conjunction with this, the review 
process in 2007 should have reconsidered surrogacy with a view to improving the 
balance between recognition of intending social parents, biological parents and 
legal parents more broadly.  The current legal framework reflects a two-parent 
(although not gendered) approach to family structure.  This is in conflict with the 
societal understanding of the contemporary family.  The contemporary family may 
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take many forms as is evidenced by the practice of surrogacy itself that allows for 
up to 6 legally identifiable parents. At the opposing end of the spectrum, the 
contemporary family unit also comprises single-parent families.   
3.11  Singled Out - The Non-Inclusion of Single People  
 At present, current legislation reflects a two-parent approach when 
regulating assisted reproduction which mirrors the hetero-normative family 
structure. Gamble and Ghevaert comment that ‘single parents remain poorly 
catered for, one example being their ineligibility to apply for a parental order to 
become the legal parent of a child through surrogacy’85.  The law now permits 
those outside of the heterosexual family unit to apply for a parental order; 
however the single person is still prohibited.   It is noted that, ‘[b]etween 1970 and 
1990 the percentage of lone-mother families more than doubled to 18 per cent.  
The anxiety of the 1980s and 1990s was therefore about the separation of 
marriage and parenthood’86, and it therefore unsurprising that the HFE Act 1990 
illustrates a strong preference for dualistic parenting.  Again, the tenacity of the 
dualistic approach to parenting (reflected by the exclusion of single parents to 
acquire parental orders) is a further example of how the legal approach to assisted 
reproduction attempts to guide the family structure in order to preserve the 
hetero-normative family unit, despite social change and an increasing number of 
single parent families. It is observed that ‘the two-parent ideal is often some 
distance from the social reality of parents and children’87; law should attempt to 
reflect society, instead of attempting to conjure a social structure that no longer 
universally exists.  However, Richard Collier and Sally Sheldon’s discussion of the 
HFE Bill 2007 (now enacted as the HFE Act 2008) reveals ‘a growing acceptance of 
single-parent and same-sex parent families’88 although the extent of this is 
questionable.   
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3.12      Conclusion 
 Gillian Douglas remarks that ‘[i]n its approach to surrogacy, the 
government originally tried to ignore it as far as possible in the hope that it would 
go away.’89  Subsequent case law and lack of legislative attention suggest that this 
remains the case.  Difficult and ethical moral debate surrounding surrogacy has 
been neglected in the legal sphere, particularly in terms of the relationship 
between surrogacy and the separation of motherhood.  Instead, the legal 
regulation of surrogacy remains largely unchanged in the medical context, and 
largely unregulated more broadly.  Avoiding issues raised by the legal regulation of 
surrogacy does not mean that the practice will cease to exist or individuals will be 
deterred from turning to surrogacy as a means through which to produce a family.  
Jackson comments that, 
 ‘making it difficult to engage lawfully in surrogacy arrangements is 
unlikely to lead people who cannot have children in any other way than 
simply resign themselves to their childlessness.  Rather restrictive 
regulation may be the catalyst for them to travel abroad to find a surrogate 
mother, or to make unlawful contracts in a regulatory vacuum’90. 
 This chapter has shown transferring mother status is a difficult process as 
the social construction of motherhood is not reflected in the legal regulation of 
surrogacy and instead creates a fictitious picture of motherhood.  This fictitious 
picture of motherhood detailed in surrogacy prescribes the gestational as the 
default legal mother, when in fact, the surrogate often does not identify as a 
mother at all in a social context.  Moreover, the role of social mother is not 
reflected or protected in surrogacy regulation typically because only one woman 
can assume the role of legal mother mirroring the hetero-normative construction 
of a mother who fulfils all ‘mother’ roles.     
 The difficulties inherent within surrogacy regulation are a direct result of 
the hetero-normative ideals it seeks to preserve.  Whilst the current law fails to 
regulate and provide protection to all interested parties within the surrogacy 
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arrangement (such as the social intending mother) the HFE Act’s response to 
medically-assisted surrogacy imposes restrictive conditions upon arrangements 
particularly in relation to parental orders.  The transferral of parenthood and 
motherhood more specifically, provides a stark contrast to the non-regulation of 
surrogacy more broadly.  The legal approach to surrogacy is not consistent, and 
through its inconsistency frames motherhood as a hetero-normative gendered 
construct which is at odds with social understanding.    
 Consequently, legal reform is urgently required.  The review of the HFE Act 
1990 was the ideal opportunity to re-think the legal regulation of surrogacy, 
welcoming it in to the public sphere.  This, however, was not the case.  Gamble and 
Ghevaert add that ‘by tidying the existing law rather than taking a fresh 
perspective, there is a lot the Act has not done.’91  While public attention and 
feminist concern over surrogacy has continued to mount, inadequate 
parliamentary space is consistently allocated to the legal regulation of surrogacy.   
The structural core of surrogacy regulation must be reshaped in order to offer 
greater inclusion to non-normative mothers that will reflect the true social reality 
of motherhood.  Only a holistic model of motherhood will be able to adapt to the 
multi-faceted construction of who can be a mother ensuring that the best interests 
of the child are determined adequately within the context of surrogacy.   
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4. RETHINKING SURROGACY ARRANGEMENTS 
4. 1  Introduction 
Due to an uncomfortable societal response to surrogacy in its beginnings as an 
accepted method of conception enveloped in ethical issues, the initial legal 
response to surrogacy has proved troublesome.   As a consequence of this, 
surrogacy is inadequately regulated by law due to conflict between social and legal 
representations of motherhood.  This chapter will argue that greater legal 
recognition of the various mother roles involved in surrogacy will provide a way 
forward in improving how the best interests of the child are determined.  
Developing the arguments of Wallbank, it will be suggested that current regulation 
‘should move away from a system whereby one mother is chosen over another.’1  
This will encourage acceptance of non-normative mothers in law and society more 
broadly, rejecting and helping to dispel hetero-normative ideals surrounding 
motherhood.   
Diduck and O’Donovan point out that,  
 ‘[f]amily law is … about the regulation of individuals and the regulation of 
the relationships those individuals form, and one of the tensions inherent in 
feminist family law is the treatment of the family rather than the individual as the 
unit of analysis.  Looking at both simultaneously, or leaving the choice to persons 
as to where they situate themselves, seems to be desirable.’2 
 This chapter will adopt Diduck and O’Donovan’s terminology, incorporating 
understanding of the individual and her choices to engage with motherhood 
through pregnancy or social mothering as well as her relationships.  This will 
provide an alternative route through which to regulate surrogacy.  At present, the 
legal approach to surrogacy focuses explicitly on the hetero-normative family unit 
and its protection which leads to the alternative route suggested in this chapter.  
The alternative approach to surrogacy regulation presented here will 
simultaneously recognise the interests of the gestational, genetic and social 
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mothers as well as the impact of her choices upon the broader familial structure 
which in turn will strive to protect collective interests.   Central (and most 
persistent) reasons against the practice of surrogacy are that the practice breeds 
exploitation and commodification of women’s bodies3.  Focussing explicitly upon 
the choices of women who wish to become mothers (whether surrogate or social) 
as the impetus behind surrogacy law will ensure that worries about exploitation 
and other similar concerns (as far as is reasonably possible) may be soothed.   
 At present, gestational motherhood is constructed in law as the central 
pillar of the family unit, particularly in the context of surrogacy in England and 
Wales.  Family formation is dependent upon her consent; without consent the 
intending mother cannot be recognised as a legal mother, nor can a parental order 
be awarded.  In contested cases, unless it is viewed by the courts to be in the best 
interests of the child to reside with the intending parent(s) (and as discussed, this 
eventuality is rare4) the surrogate is the legal mother with full rights and 
responsibilities.  This ultimately undermines the involvement of the 
commissioning party in the conception of the child.  Kirsty Horsey observes that 
without the ‘initiative and intention’ of the intending parent(s) ‘the child would not 
have been created.  It is undeniable that but for them, the conception and birth of 
that particular child could not have happened’.5  In spite of this, the intending 
parents’ involvement in the conception of the child (as well as any genetic 
contribution), the gestational relationship between the surrogate and child is the 
lynchpin which determines the child’s familial structure.  The two-parent dyadic 
structure which places the surrogate as the only automatic legal parent attempts to 
preserve the hetero-normative family.   
 The importance and relevance of the patriarchal family within society in the 
context of surrogacy is diminished.  While the best interests of the child should 
                                                             
3 For example, Woman’s Hour (19 January 2011) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/p00dc89s> 
accessed 19 January 201l.  Julie Bindel raised concerns in conversation with Tony Drewitt-Barlow 
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5 K. Horsey, ‘Challenging presumptions: legal parenthood and surrogacy arrangements’ (2010) 
Child and Family Law Quarterly at 456 
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remain central when determining legal parentage (both in statute and common 
law), the practice of surrogacy represents a clear challenge to the two-parent 
dyadic structure.  Considerations of surrogacy in law as a practice should not be 
ignored but at present law reinforces hetero-normative ideals surrounding 
motherhood.  In so doing, the interests of the intending parents, both in the 
conception of the child and intention to be recognised as primary caregivers are 
ignored in the first instance.  Wallbank suggests that,  
 ‘Multiple parenthood abounds in contemporary society through 
fostering, open adoption and step-parenting in the best case scenario, 
without causing undue harm and distress to children.  Perhaps the way 
forward with surrogacy law is to provide a model that recognises and 
institutes that all the parties involved (including the child) have a potential 
interest in the child’s welfare and that there should be no need to decide 
cases on the either/or approach.’6 
 Multiple parenthood is recognised in law through the legal mechanism of 
parental responsibility.  However the legal approach to surrogacy specifically is 
unsatisfactory.  This chapter will argue that surrogacy law should be reshaped and 
reformed in alignment with Wallbank’s view that surrogacy law should recognise 
all parties who engage with surrogacy, focusing on their intentions and interests in 
the child’s welfare.   This will include the interests of the surrogate, and the 
commissioning party.   
 This chapter will argue that the gestational relationship between surrogate 
and child, and ideologies surrounding this relationship as supremely natural, 
should not drive forward legal presumptions in favour of the natural mother7.  To 
do so, surrogacy regulation should recognise the various ‘mother’ roles as equal.  
At present, the hierarchical structure of ‘mother’ roles in law is at odds with the 
social construction of motherhood.  Subsequently, it will be argued that the social 
reality of motherhood is not represented in law, instead imposing a restrictive 
view of motherhood upon those who engage with assisted reproduction practices 
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sex Partner).  
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such as surrogacy.  It will be argued that surrogacy law does not provide legal 
recognition to all mother roles adequately by outlining two primary failings.  These 
are: 1) lack of legal involvement;2) failure to recognise various types of 
motherhood within surrogacy and their relationship with the long-term best 
interests of the child. Each failing will be considered in turn, whilst offering 
potential solutions to the current legal incertitude surrounding surrogacy.   
 This chapter will argue that in order to respond to current legal failings, a 
new Surrogacy Act should be enacted.  This Act will allow incorporate the 
introduction of surrogacy contracts, looking to ‘surrogacy-friendly’ jurisdictions 
for instruction and guidance.  Surrogacy contracts will change the current default 
legal status of the surrogate based upon intention, offering greater legal parity 
between all interested parties in the child’s welfare.  The Act will also adapt 
parental status to recognise different types of mothers, offering a solution to the 
current problematic legal framework.  This Act will also actively recognise 
different types of ‘mother’ in law utilising shared legal motherhood.   
 To summarise, this chapter will argue that the current legal regulation of 
surrogacy reinforces hetero-normative ideals surrounding motherhood because it 
preserves the two-parent dyadic structure.  As a result of this, the various ‘mother’ 
roles are treated differently in law, protecting the role of the gestational mother 
over others.  By so doing, legal and social constructions of motherhood are at odds.  
It will be argued that conflict between legal and social constructions of 
motherhood exists ultimately because the current legal framework is not involved 
in the development of surrogacy arrangements.  The introduction of a new 
Surrogacy Act will be presented as a solution to the current legal failings 
introducing surrogacy contracts and shared legal motherhood, ultimately 
improving the legal construction of motherhood and reflecting the lived 
experiences of women.    
4.2  (Mis)understanding Surrogacy – Changing Attitudes 
 Following on from discussion regarding social attitudes towards surrogacy 
in Chapter two, the relationship between changing social attitudes and law will 
now be examined.  Understanding the societal/feminist reaction to surrogacy is 
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imperative in determining how surrogacy arrangements should be regulated by 
law.  The purpose of law broadly is a much debated philosophical question with no 
right answer; however whether one believes that law is a system of rules to be 
followed8, or is developed and guided by moral beliefs, it can be satisfactorily 
accepted that law must develop and evolve with the practices and attitudes of 
society.9  Current societal attitudes towards surrogacy have, to a certain extent, 
progressed from the radical feminist position towards surrogacy as outlined in 
Chapter Two.  It will be argued in this section that because attitudes towards 
surrogacy are changing, so too should the law.  A positive legal response to 
surrogacy will highlight and encourage societal acceptance of families conceived in 
this way.   
 Early feminist reaction to surrogacy and the wider social response to 
surrogacy were often similar in their negativity10.   Writing from an Australian 
legal perspective, Jocelynne Scutt’s response to surrogacy11 in 1991 mirrors the 
contemporary response to surrogacy from women such as Julie Bindel12 speaking 
publicly on radio in the UK.13  Scutt’s argument centres upon traditional criticisms 
of surrogacy, for example, that surrogacy does not recognise the status of the 
surrogate as ‘the “real” mother’14.  The irony of this is that in law in the UK, the 
surrogate is recognised as the “real” mother as she is the default legal mother.  
Scutt argues that surrogacy law supports the notion of “woman as receptacle”15; 
and most importantly laws should discourage surrogacy arrangements so that 
women are deterred from entering into “surrogacy” arrangements.16  Similarly, 
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Bindel raised concerns ‘about thousands of women being exploited by richer 
parents’17 and forced into surrogacy for economic purposes.   
 The broader societal response has often been in agreement with the 
(predominantly radical) feminist perspective on surrogacy18 .  However, central 
differences are present.   Radical feminist thinkers reject surrogacy due to its 
ability to reinforce hetero-normative structure through the exploitation of 
women.19  Corea - writing in 1985 - voices concerns surrounding surrogacy; the 
role of mothers20; and male control over women bodies to uphold the hetero-
normative family unit. 21 She argues: ‘[t]here is no discussion [within the 
reproductive technologies debate] about the construction of motherhood and the 
question of real ‘choice’ a woman has in a society that continues to equate ‘real’ 
woman with mother and wife.’22  Instead Corea argues the aim is to allow men 
control over reproductive matters, which in turn reinforces their positions as 
patriarchal centre of the family unit.  Contrary to this, wider social response raised 
concern that surrogacy had the potential to challenge the hetero-normative family 
form.  This can be seen most obviously in the form of the Warnock Report.  The 
Warnock Committee’s view that ‘[t]here is little doubt that the Courts would treat 
most, if not all, surrogacy agreements as contrary to public policy and therefore 
unenforceable’23 suggests that concerns about surrogacy rest not only upon 
commercial surrogacy arrangements but upon policy concerns about how families 
are formed.  Judith Bourne and Caroline Derry comment that ‘the Warnock 
Report’s opposition to surrogate motherhood can be seen to be based upon 
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supporting the patriarchal family.’24  Mackenzie acknowledges the ‘disruptive 
potential’25 of surrogacy for the idealisation of the traditional family unit and it 
perhaps this concept which fuelled the Warnock Report’s criticism of surrogacy.   
 As discussed previously in detail, surrogacy separates ‘mother’ roles and 
therefore family structures involved in surrogacy are different to the traditional 
norm.   The wider social issue here is that surrogacy allows non-normative family 
units to develop due to ‘unnatural’ constructions of motherhood.  Van den Akker 
discusses the traditional family and structural functionalist theory. She observes 
that surrogacy allows perceptions of ‘unnatural’ motherhood to develop as 
diversity from traditional norms based upon biological and in social terms is seen 
as deviant26.  The majority of women who become mothers fulfil all three mother 
roles (gestation, genetic and social) - as this type of motherhood is most common, 
it is assumed to be the most natural form of motherhood in particular by the 
courts, as can be seen during recent cases such as CW v NT27.  The difficulty lies in 
the surrogate’s (and to a lesser extent, the intending mother’s) rejection of 
‘natural’ motherhood in its truest form.  Ultimately, to define surrogate 
motherhood and surrogate families as ‘unnatural’ in a legal sense undermines the 
reproductive choices and autonomy of women who freely choose to become 
surrogates.  McCandless and Sheldon note, ‘the coherence of the legal ‘sexual 
family’ ideal is increasingly out of touch with demographic reality’28 as the authors 
point out many children are not raised by two parents29 and an increasing number 
of children are conceived with the aid of reproductive techniques.  The law as it 
stands reinforces the patriarchal family form whilst neglecting non-normative 
families which are developed through surrogacy.  The choices of women to engage 
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with non-normative forms of motherhood are therefore overshadowed and reform 
is required to rectify this.   
 Moreover, Helene Ragone argues that: ‘[f]rom the couple’s perspective, 
surrogacy is conceptualied not as a radical departure from tradition but as an 
attempt to achieve a traditional and acceptable end: to have a child who is 
biologically related to at least one of them’30.  If this view is correct, it is evidence of 
how society privileges the hetero-normative family structure, despite its 
increasing absence.  One of the reasons for this may be due to the legal response to 
the family unit.  Law continues to privilege traditional constructions and as society 
and its practices mirror this attitude as a result, society generally fails to welcome 
surrogacy families as an example of a normative family.   
Recent research has shown that, 
 ‘negative feelings towards surrogacy and parenthood in general are 
held by the part of the population that is not involved with surrogacy and 
are likely to impact on the feeling of stigma associated with the practice.  
However, they (the researchers) suggest that such negative effects could 
possibly be helped by their study, which links ‘alternative means of 
becoming a family to positive (rather than negative) family values.’31   
 Poote and van den Akker discuss the lack of academic interest in public 
opinions regarding assisted conception and surrogacy and attempt to bridge this 
gap.32  However, they found that further research is required using larger sample 
sizes to determine majority attitudes towards surrogacy.33  Social attitudes will 
only be improved with the aid of further research into the practice of surrogacy.  
As a result of this, further reassessment of the legal recognition of mothers and 
surrogacy more broadly will follow. This will create a clearer picture for those 
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involved in surrogacy and, more broadly, for society about surrogacy in practice 
and the law.   
 Further, as surrogacy is an unexplored area, information available to 
commissioning parties and the surrogate in terms of legal rights can often be 
misguided.  In the case of Re X and Y34  Hedley J commented that ‘the quality of the 
information currently available is variable and may, in what it omits, actually be 
misleading.’35  Further, Coleridge J highlighted the lack of regulation governing 
surrogacy agencies which often provide information to intending parents (and 
indeed did so to the surrogate in the matter of Baby N).  He urged ‘all such agencies 
to ensure their checks into the background of all parties… (are) as thorough as 
they can be’.36 Agencies screening those involved in surrogacy arrangements must 
be accurate, both in the information they provide and about the suitability and 
well-being of those involved.  Further exploration of the practice of surrogacy, 
psychologically, legally and socially will encourage greater acceptance of surrogacy 
within the public sphere and in turn would improve what is known about 
surrogacy.  Surrogacy figures are currently rare, with information from Surrogacy 
UK (discussed previously) appearing now to be out of date, however it can be 
assumed that due to the vast amount of media attention directed towards this 
practice particularly for gay men, the number of surrogacy families it increasing.  
As the public profile of surrogacy increases, it as will its acceptability as a 
reproductive method and there may be more surrogacy as a result of this.   
 It has been suggested that ‘concerns about privacy have led to limited 
availability of research participants, especially intended parents.’37 This is 
problematic – if research into surrogacy cannot move forward, the practice itself 
remains shrouded in secrecy, particularly for those who engage with surrogacy in 
the home and do not engage with IVF clinics.  In turn, without research and greater 
insight into surrogacy and its potential benefits, the legal picture will remain 
unchanged in favour of the normative family structure.  To improve the legal 
regulation of surrogacy is a two-pronged process.  Those who engage with 
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surrogacy often offer advice and guidance which so far has helped to inform those 
entering into surrogacy arrangements that are unaware of its complexities – a 
good example of this is the work of Barrie and Tony-Drewitt Barlow38.  Academic 
research into surrogacy has found that the practice is not damaging to children as 
it often present in media ‘scare’ stories39.  A recent study has ‘found that there 
were surprisingly few differences between egg donation, donor insemination, 
surrogacy and natural conception families in terms of family relationships and 
parent and child psychological wellbeing.’40  Whilst the study is still ongoing, (as 
they continue to follow the development of the families involved), it is a step in the 
right direction in terms of removing the social stigma attached to the practice of 
surrogacy as it re-examines societal concerns about the ‘unnatural’ nature of 
surrogacy, and the prevalence of the gestational relationship above other mother 
roles.  Judges and those engaging with surrogacy are beginning to speak out, 
voicing concerns and are receiving answers from those who engage most with the 
practice.41  As a result of this, the role of law in regulation surrogacy is diminished 
as social attitudes continue to change.  This leads to the question, how might the 
law change to reflect societal understandings of surrogacy and contemporary 
families?   
4.3  Primary Failings – And a Solution 
 There are two primary failings of current surrogacy regulation which have 
resulted in disjuncture between societal attitudes and law.  Law must follow 
societal attitudes in order to provide effective regulation, as well as helping to 
improve remaining stigma surrounding surrogacy and its acceptance.  These 
primary failings are: 1) lack of legal involvement 2) failure to recognise various 
types of motherhood within surrogacy and their relationship with the long-term 
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best interests of the child.  Each failing will be addressed and responded to in order 
to examine how the law can, and should, be changed to develop a model of law 
which reflects the experiences of those involved. Surrogacy is a shared experience 
of motherhood as discussed in Chapter One.  This shared experienced should be 
recognised in law explicitly, as well as preserving and protecting the best interests 
of the child and all others involved.  Arguments surrounding an increased use of 
surrogacy are important, but as Blyth argues ‘a demand for surrogacy alone is 
insufficient to account for its prevalence.’42  That surrogacy takes place at all is 
obviously dependant on the willingness of women to become surrogate mothers.  
Surrogacy law should therefore be changed with a view to incorporating the 
experiences of women involved of surrogacy detailing understanding of the 
relationship between surrogate mother and intending parties.   
 It is a traditional feminist argument that women’s reproductive choices 
should not be restricted by the state in reference to legal regulation preventing 
women from governing their own bodies; for example, in the context of abortion43.  
However many feminists argue differently about surrogacy, despite parallels 
between them.  This is primarily due to the association between surrogacy and 
economic coercion.  In the context of surrogacy, concerns regarding exploitation of 
women (much like prostitution44) persist.  It is argued by contemporary feminist 
voices that surrogacy regulation should be brought into the public sphere to 
remove this stigma.  Jackson suggests that arguments linking surrogacy and 
prostitution such as those presented by Dworkin45 are similar to conservative 
ideals which suggest ‘that women’s sexual and procreative lives should be confined 
to the private sphere.’46    She argues that there continues to be ‘an unwarranted 
pessimism about our capacity to institute effective regulation’47, keeping women 
and children from harm. Bringing surrogacy law in to the public sphere will not 
result in ‘baby-selling’ or necessarily in increased exploitation of women, 
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particularly because at present it is claimed ‘pessimistic prophesies of the damage 
wreaked by surrogacy thus seem unfounded.’48  Increased regulation and state 
interference with surrogacy will help to improve social attitudes towards non-
normative families.  In order to bring surrogacy in to the public sphere, it is argued 
here that legal involvement in the surrogacy arrangement process should be 
improved.  This raises the issue of the first, and most significant, primary failing 
which should be addressed – a lack of legal involvement.     
4.4  Lack of Legal Involvement 
 At present, legal involvement with surrogacy is minimal.  All surrogacy 
arrangements are unregulated unless the arrangement is commercial in nature.  
Legal involvement occurs only within a medical context when IVF treatment is 
required, thus law governs fertility treatment - not surrogacy.   Surrogacy 
arrangements are often privately arranged oral agreements or involve surrogacy 
agencies such as COTS (Childlessness Overcome Through Surrogacy) negotiating 
contact between parties.49  As a result of this, there is no regulatory body or legal 
instrument to ensure that the best interests of all parties involved are protected.  
Based upon current legislation (SAA 1985) as its starting point, a new Surrogacy 
Act should be developed to govern all surrogacy arrangements and improve legal 
involvement with surrogacy.  Monitoring surrogacy arrangement is paramount to 
understanding the development of non-normative families; preventing 
exploitation of women; and ensuring the rights of commissioning parties are 
recognised.  A new approach is required and, importantly, should not be seen to 
place further burdens upon those who chose to develop their families through 
surrogacy.  Current legal involvement with surrogacy through the HFE Act (1990 
and 2008) has received criticism for its restrictive approach to non-normative 
families.  Jackson in particular has raised concern in relation to the HFE Act’s 
attempt to govern conception choices and the welfare principle which must be 
satisfied prior to the commencement of treatment by clinics for IVF and other 
assisted reproduction methods.  Jackson argues that, 
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‘[m]onitoring these exceptional personal choices in order to identify ill-
judged or improper conception decisions would be unreservedly 
condemned as an unacceptable intrusive abuse of state power if the welfare 
principle was applied to those couples who were able to conceive without 
the aid of reproductive treatment.’50 
 This argument could also be forwarded against greater legal regulation of 
surrogacy arrangements.  However, greater legal involvement would not condemn 
or influence reproductive decisions – instead it would help those involved to make 
informed decisions.  Increased legal recognition of surrogacy in the form of 
regulation would provide a clearer picture to those entering in to surrogacy.   
Gamble and Ghevaert state that ‘[t]here is clear demand for informal assisted 
conception at home and for treatment at clinics abroad, giving rise to new legal 
problems for the families involved’51 and therefore new legal mechanisms should 
be introduced to oversee this demand.   
4.5  A New Surrogacy Act 
 In order to address the current legal failings of surrogacy regulation, a new 
Surrogacy Act should be enacted.  The critique of the legal regulation of surrogacy 
presented does not address in full the complex legal and ethical issues surrounding 
surrogacy, but commercial surrogacy arrangements will remain prohibited placing 
greater focus upon the enforceability of surrogacy contracts and the parenthood 
provisions.   
 Second, the Surrogacy Act will allow surrogacy contracts.  Surrogacy 
contracts, discussed extensively by academics such as Jackson and Mackenzie, offer 
a central solution to the current failings of surrogacy regulation in terms of 
improving legal involvement and beyond.  The introduction of pre-conception 
surrogacy arrangements, or pre-arrangement assessment as termed by 
Mackenzie52, or ‘memorandum of understanding’53 as termed by the Brazier’s 
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Reports recommended Code of Practice, would signify a radical departure from a 
complex, and often restrictive, legal framework.  The introduction of surrogacy 
contracts provides the opportunity for all surrogacy arrangements to be regulated 
by law unlike current legislation.  Gamble reports that many couples are unaware 
of the ‘potential legal pitfalls’, particularly those travelling abroad for surrogacy.54  
It is therefore follows that the legal regulation of surrogacy requires great 
improvement primarily to ensure that children born through surrogacy are not 
affected by legal obstacles which may upon impinge the identification of their legal 
parents.  The legal position of those entering in to surrogacy arrangements must be 
clear to ensure that the legal mother and father are identified, and furthermore 
that the legal mother and father are those who wish to undertake the care and 
well-being of the child.  Surrogacy contracts would enable the surrogate and 
commissioning party to overcome the current legal hurdles which may affect 
transferral of legal parentage faced by many surrogacy families.   Surrogacy 
contracts would help to avoid situations such as those in Re X and Y55 in which the 
children involved were potentially stateless and parentless as all parties would be 
made aware of the legal process in relation to parenthood prior to entering in to a 
legal relationship.  A move away from the legal current framework which upholds 
altruistic surrogacy as the preferred model is required to ensure that informal 
agreements are not entered in to.  The altruistic model of surrogacy preferred by 
the Warnock Report56  (and hence the reason surrogacy is inadequately regulated) 
is based upon the selfless act of the surrogate to give birth for the benefit of others.   
This means that some surrogacy arrangements are regulated (where fertility 
treatment is used) and the rest are not because surrogacy is framed in law as a 
form of altruism.  Lack of regulation is not in the best interests of the child as 
decisions regarding the child’s parentage must be made post-birth.  Horsey 
comments that: ‘it is surely better all round for the parents of a planned child to be 
determined prior its birth – and where better than at conception (or pre-
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conception) to avoid uncertainty or dispute?’57  Enforceable surrogacy contracts 
should be utilised to map out the intentions of those involved in the surrogacy 
arrangements to avoid conflict and impact upon the welfare of the child.   
 Additionally, information regarding surrogacy law is often received by 
commissioning parties through not-for-profit agencies such as COTS58 and concern 
has been voiced regarding the regulation of non-profit agencies.  Speaking publicly, 
Lord Macfarlane said, ‘I did express concern that these agencies, well meaning 
though they undoubtedly are, were not audited or regulated in any way as to the 
quality of advice that they gave couples approaching them for their service.’59 
Although not-for-profit agencies may operate lawfully, they are not regulated by 
law.  Further, Dewinder Birk notes that both the 1990 and 2008 provisions do not 
 ‘allow for effective monitoring of the incidences and the outcome of 
partial surrogacy in contrast with the obtaining and maintaining of 
information and records the HFEA is charged with carrying out in respect of 
other treatment.’60 
 The introduction of surrogacy contracts would ensure that the law is 
understood thoroughly by the parties and would allow greater access to 
information about the outcome of arrangements.  But, this can only happen if it is 
stipulated by law that all surrogacy arrangements will only be recognised in law if 
they are detailed in contractual terms.   For surrogacy contracts to be effective, 
there must be an incentive for surrogates and commissioning parties to enter in to 
legal proceedings.  Here, the key incentive is that surrogacy contracts ensure that 
the legal interests of the party are negotiated and legally preserved prior to 
conception should the arrangement fail.  The disadvantage of this approach is that 
this key incentive may not entice those who wish to limit state interference with 
their reproductive decisions.   It may also be difficult to incite a shift away from the 
current unregulated model of altruistic surrogacy.  The introduction of surrogacy 
contracts would not necessarily ensure that those engaging in surrogacy will move 
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away from oral agreements in favour of time-consuming, and possibly expensive 
legal agreements.  
 However, Jackson, a strong advocate for the incorporation of contract law 
into the realm of surrogacy, argues that ‘contract law might offer a productive 
framework for some aspects of the facilitative regulation of surrogacy.’61  Jackson 
argues that contract law is well-equipped to deal with unfair arrangements and is 
able to govern and render void (or, indeed, voidable) exploitative agreements in 
the context of surrogacy, but it is also capable of much more.62  Contract law would 
also permit surrogacy arrangements to be carried out within the private sphere, 
away from interference by the state due to the principle of freedom of contract.63  
In sum, 
 ‘[g]iven its capacity to promote reproductive freedom while 
simultaneously policing onerous or unconscionable bargains, unlike the 
commonly favoured family law model some aspects of modern contract law 
might offer a flexible and accommodating framework for the voluntary 
transfer of parental obligations.’64 
 A new legal approach to surrogacy through contract will enable the law to 
track the intentions of surrogate mothers and commissioning parties whilst at the 
same time allowing them to define their own familial structure in terms of how the 
arrangement is carried out.  The contractual terms of the arrangement should be 
decided by the parties themselves preserving the current way in which surrogacy 
arrangements vary in terms of medical intervention and process thus, instead of 
retrospective involvement with surrogacy concerning payment or foreign 
arrangements, the court will be aware of the interests of all involved from the 
outset through documentation and court-approval, as will be discussed in detail 
below.   
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 This will place the individuals who enter into a surrogacy arrangement in a 
much improved position.  When the arrangement is non-contested, difficulties 
which may occur when obtaining a parental order such as time constraints or that 
the child must reside with the intending parent(s) (who do not have legal 
responsibilities) from birth will be avoided and dealt with prior to conception.  The 
court will also be better equipped to deal with other instances of failed surrogacy, 
for example, what should occur if the contract does not stipulate what should 
happen if the child is born disabled or the commissioning party separate if they are 
a couple.  This will ensure that in the event of a failed agreement, the decision to 
determine the child best interest’s remains with the courts.  In so arguing it is 
important not to overstate the number of contested surrogacy arrangements.  
Surrogacy arrangements are in court for a number of reasons.  Most obviously is 
when the surrogate’s intentions change and she wishes to remain as the child’s 
legal and social mother – but this is in fact relatively rare.  More common are cases 
that come before the courts due to difficulties in obtaining a parental order, 
typically because payment has been made to the surrogacy (usually in an overseas 
foreign agreement).  The reason behind a larger number of cases concerning 
parental orders is because the current legal framework imposes legal obstacles, 
making surrogacy and the legal transferral of rights difficult in the UK.   
 Ultimately, the process of surrogacy should be regulated by contract law, 
moving away from the current altruistic model of surrogacy which leads to 
informal arrangements often based upon inaccurate legal information about 
parentage.  Most importantly, surrogacy contracts provide the opportunity to track 
the intentions of the parties in the unlikely event that the arrangement is 
contested.  Because the intentions of the parties will be discussed and agreed, this 
ensures that all ‘mother’ roles are included and their interests are recorded legally.  
Surrogacy contracts will also prohibit the current problems with parental orders 
as outlined in Chapter Two allowing those parents who wish to be recognised in a 
legal capacity to do so more easily.     
4.6 Legal Status of Surrogacy Contracts 
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 Rethinking surrogacy regulation within the ambit of contract law raises 
several questions.  The most important issue for consideration is the legal status of 
surrogacy contracts.  At present, all surrogacy arrangements are unenforceable in 
law.   The introduction of surrogacy contracts would reverse this position.  It is 
proposed here that surrogacy contracts should be used to guide and monitor all 
surrogacy arrangements through the legal process of transferring legal status from 
the surrogate to the intending party.  Applying basic principles of contract law to 
surrogacy, all agreements must be enforceable otherwise the purpose of the 
contract is diluted.  The doctrine of consideration, and an intention to create a legal 
relationship would apply.  In other words, there must be a legal consequence to the 
contractual process between parties if both parties intend to enter in to a legal 
relationship that will result in the birth of a child and transferral of parenthood.  
Without enforceability, it is clear that the best interests test often favours the 
surrogate and her wishes when the arrangement fails.  Enforceable surrogacy 
contracts will enable the courts to explicitly take into account the conception 
method of the child when determining who is most able to care for the child.  This 
is particularly important for the commissioning party as without their initial 
arrangement the surrogate, the child would not have been born.  It therefore 
follows that there must be a legal consequence to the surrogacy context and this 
consequence should be the transferral of legal parenthood through parental order 
(which will be discussed in more detail below).     
 Interplay between family and contract law may prove troublesome in an 
area which is ethical sensitive.  However, Jackson argues that surrogacy contracts 
(due to their specificity in time as pregnancy lasts for 9 months only) ‘may be more 
akin to a contract for services’ and ‘if either party were to fail to fulfil their 
obligations under the agreement, the remedy would lie in damages, rather than 
specific performance.’65  This would prohibit enforced separation between the 
child and the surrogate should she no longer wish to complete the contract.  This 
approach, Jackson continues, ‘would not have the same potential to wreak havoc 
with the basic liberties of the surrogate mother.’66   Further, unfair clauses which 
may be seen to interfere with her bodily integrity or ‘restrict the surrogate 
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mother’s decision-making authority about the management of her pregnancy could 
be struck out.’67  Jackson’s model of surrogacy contract law also acknowledges the 
need for ‘statutory prohibition of terms relating to the health of the child’ and the 
risk of an unwanted child.68  She recommends default rules allocating 
‘responsibility for that risk to the individuals responsible for the child’s 
conception, namely the commissioning couple.’69  The advantages of Jackson’s 
model which may be used to reshape surrogacy law can clearly be seen.   
4.7  Intention 
 The transferral of motherhood will be a trackable process and surrogacy 
contracts will ensure that legal parenthood is determined based upon intention.  
The surrogacy contracts will be drawn up based upon the intention that the 
commissioning couple wish to become parents, actively caring for the child, 
whereas the surrogate does not intend to do this.  By entering into a surrogacy 
contract, intention is the impetus for transferral of parenthood.  Jackson argues 
that ‘[t]o ignore the centrality of their [commissioning party] intention to keep the 
child may not promote the child’s welfare.’70  It is consequently in the interests of 
all parties, especially the child, to ensure that the intention of the parties is 
recognised in law.  Horsey argues that:  
‘intention’ should operate as the pre-birth determinant in ‘awarding’ 
parental status’ defined as ‘the motivation to have a child, initiation and 
involvement in the procreative process and a commitment to nurture and 
care’. 
 Horsey presents four arguments in favour of utilising intention as a legal 
concept specifically in the context of surrogacy.  First, the conception of the child 
does not commence but for the intention of the commissioning.  Second, the 
intending parent(s) initiated the child’s birth ‘and intend to be the ones actively in 
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its care71.  Third, intention should be noted as it is unfair to permit the surrogate to 
renege on the agreement when it was her original intention to relinquish her 
parental rights.  Fourth,  
 ‘there are good pragmatic reasons for acknowledging parenthood 
before conception, centred upon a need for certainty and uniformity: 
intending parents would understand from the outset that they will be 
presumed legal parents and are therefore responsible for the child’s well-
being’72. 
 Horsey’s argument in favour of an intention-based test to determine 
parenthood in surrogacy strengthens arguments here in favour of a contractual 
intention-based approach to surrogacy and parenthood.  An intention-based test 
reflects the social reality of motherhood.  The surrogate will not intend to act in a 
legal capacity as a mother, just as the social mother intends to be recognised as a 
legal mother (eventually) from the outset.  This is an example of retrospective legal 
intervention after the child has been born which is clearly not in the best interests 
of the child as who are the child’s legal parents will be uncertain.   
 Horsey also notes that the introduction of an intention-based examination 
(as well as the introduction of contract law in the new Surrogacy Act discussed 
here) will abolish the complex parental order process.73  Surrogacy contracts will 
remove the need for parental orders as parental status will be awarded based 
upon intention.   Concerns regarding parental orders include the ‘non-extendable 
time limit of 6 months from the date of birth for the commissioning parents to 
apply for a parental order’74 and the notion that ‘eligibility for a parental order is 
conditional upon the child already living with the commissioning couple.’75  These 
conditions appear to be nonsensical as they require a child to live with two 
individuals who will have no legal relationship with the child (even though a 
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biological relationship will be present between at least one of the individuals and 
the child).  There appears to be a great deal of legal uncertainty in the initial stages 
of the child’s life as the legal status of his/her mothers remains undecided.  Six 
months is also a small period of time especially if the couple have travelled abroad 
to enter into an agreement with a foreign surrogate.  The practical problems 
regarding birth registration and extra-territorial considerations may mean that the 
six month time limit should be extended to allow for the increasing popularity of 
foreign surrogacy arrangements.   Parental orders will therefore be replaced with 
intention to determine parentage as part of the contractual process.   
 It is proposed here that the parental order process should be removed in 
favour of an intention-based test.  Once a child has been born and the contract is 
complete, parental status will automatically be attached to the intending parent(s).  
At present, only couples can acquire legal status as parents through surrogacy.  
This excludes single parents.  The introduction of surrogacy contracts and 
intention would ensure that single women could engage with this reproductive 
method.  It is also stated that a biological relationship must be present between at 
least one intending parent and the child, and ‘[w]hy this is the case is unclear’.76  
This will ensure that any legal ambiguities surrounding legal parentage and 
responsibility arising out of the parental order process will be avoided.  It is 
important to avoid such ambiguities in the event that a child should require life 
saving treatment where consent must be given by a legal parent.  This will ensure 
that transferring legal title continues to be a trackable process.  More importantly, 
Horsey concludes that ‘the intending couple and the surrogate would be 
recognised for the actual roles they play’.77  This would ensure that the social 
reality of motherhood is reflected, dispelling hetero-normative ideals within the 
current legal framework which privilege gestational and genetic motherhood over 
intention.   
4.8  The Israeli Example 
 To examine how surrogacy contracts should be regulated in England and 
Wales and determine the content and formalities behind surrogacy contracts, it is 
                                                             




important to look to lessons from other jurisdictions where surrogacy contracts 
are both legal and enforceable.  The Israeli system is an example of such78. The 
Israeli example is utilised to support the argument presented in favour of contract 
law here.   In Israel ‘[a] state-appointed approvals committee screens all 
surrogates and couples according to a centralised set of criteria, and all contracts 
are signed in the committee’s presence.’79  Intrafamilial surrogacy is prohibited, 
and ‘is permitted only to citizens and permanent residents of Israel, preventing 
international surrogacy.’80  Same-sex couples are prohibited from entering 
surrogacy contracts and the surrogate cannot be married.81  The central issue here 
is that although surrogacy contracts indicate a liberal response to surrogacy, this is 
not entirely the case.  This approach ensures that the well-being of the parties is 
fully-monitored prior to the conception of birth but places stringent conditions 
upon who may enter into an arrangement.  The intending parents must be married 
or partnered, and the intending woman must not be able to carry a child to term.  
She must be able to provide evidence that she has undertaken IVF treatment or has 
convincing medical reasons to contract with a surrogate.’82   These restrictive 
conditions indicate a step-back from the current developments in England and 
Wales. The UK position at present is far-more inclusive of non-normative same-sex 
couples for example who are able to acquire a parental order for surrogacy.  
Restrictions are not imposed upon who may enter into a surrogacy contract, nor is 
there a burden of proof placed upon the intending mother to establish her 
infertility.  It is proposed here that the Israeli system of surrogacy regulation 
should be adopted in the UK but without the regulatory rules which govern 
surrogacy in this jurisdiction.  As a whole, the Israeli system seems to be draconian 
for application in the UK as it prohibits same-sex parenting in the context of 
surrogacy and requires a legal partnership, but parts of this system are preferable.  
 The state-centralised approach to surrogacy screening should be adopted 
within the new Surrogacy Act.  Additionally all surrogacy contracts should be 
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signed by the commissioning individual or party in the presence of an authority.  
The new Surrogacy Act should continue to be inclusive of same-sex couples and 
allow for intrafamilial surrogacy.  It should be the role of the state to monitor 
surrogacy agreements, not to prescribe who can be involved or how the 
arrangement should be carried in order to preserve privacy in reproductive 
decision-making.  In Israel,  
 ‘couples submit a file to the approvals committee that includes 
documents attesting to their and the surrogate’s clean police records, a full 
medical history, and the results of recent medical tests showing that they 
are all healthy, disease-free and not substance abusers.’83 
 If adopted in England and Wales, screening would prohibit court 
intervention where the arrangement has failed for reasons of vulnerability on 
behalf of the surrogate, as in Re N84 for example as Mrs N’s motives here may have 
been unearthed.  Initial screening as part of the contractual process would enable 
women adopting various ‘mother’ roles within the arrangement to outline clearly 
how they perceive themselves in this role.  The women involved would be given 
the time to discuss and agree upon how they identify themselves in the relation to 
the child born through surrogacy, effectively developing a legal relationship upon 
the experiences of women.  This joins together the social realities of surrogacy in 
the form of the experiences of women with law.  The purpose of the screening 
prior to contractual agreement would be to map the intentions of the parties, 
providing the court with full knowledge of the agreement in the event that the 
arrangement should fail and come before the courts again.  It is unfortunate that a 
legal obligation for agencies or clinics to perform screening is not already in force. 
Of course, screening is not a fool-proof way to prohibit deceitful or exploitative 
surrogacy arrangements.  It does however increase the legal profile of surrogacy 
arrangements, offers safeguards and provides an attractive alternative to the 
current unregulated framework.   
 In order for screening to be effective, it must be carried out by a monitored 
committee (similar to the Israeli approvals committee) who are experienced in 
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reproduction, law and ethics.  The future of the HFEA as the central regulatory 
institution over reproductive issues in the UK is currently uncertain and will be 
disbanded shortly85.  This presents the opportunity to develop smaller authorities 
and committees to deal with specific types of assisted reproduction and is 
particularly desirable in the context of surrogacy.  Committees should include 
members of the medical and legal professions to ensure that a balanced 
assessment is carried out.   
 Additionally, one of the key issues with the Israeli regulatory framework is 
that it does not permit foreign surrogacy contracts.  Due to difficulties in the UK 
concerning commercial surrogacy payments, a similar approach here would not be 
desirable.  Recently in India, a legal framework is currently being mooted to 
incorporate foreign surrogacy arrangements in to domestic law.  The Indian 
Assisted Reproductive Technologies Regulation Bill 2010 will legally recognise 
surrogacy arrangements and ‘foreign commissioning individuals or couples must 
prove that surrogacy is permitted in their home country and that any resulting 
child will be permitted entry - and be recognised as the biological child of the 
commissioning individual or couple.’86  This approach clearly responds to calls in 
the UK to ensure that the home states of the intending party do not leave children 
born through surrogacy in a stateless position.  A legal approach reflecting the 
intentions of the Indian Bill adopted here in the UK will ensure that couples 
travelling abroad for surrogacy will not contravene UK law by entering in to a 
commercial surrogacy arrangement.  But, this is often the reason intending parties 
travel abroad to engage with commercial surrogacy due to the difficult altruistic 
model in the UK which is unregulated.  Introducing surrogacy contracts may 
reduce the demand for surrogacy overseas as surrogacy in the UK will be more 
regulated effectively and social attitudes improved.   
 To recap, lessons can be taken from overseas jurisdiction to guide the 
development of a new legal framework for surrogacy in the UK.  Similar to the 
Israeli approach, contract law should be utilised to govern surrogacy but should 
not be restricted by, or involve excessive state-interference.   
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4.9  Criticisms of Contract Law and Surrogacy 
 Jackson outlines the central criticisms against the introduction of surrogacy 
contracts.  First successful and effective surrogacy contracts, protecting the 
interests of those involved, rests upon a consensual relationship between parties.  
A number of factors may be present which prohibit authentic consent, such as 
economic reward.  It is argued that surrogates and commissioning parties are often 
in contrasting positions economically, with the commissioning couple often in a 
much stronger bargaining position87.  However, the introduction of surrogacy 
contracts and their regulation would take the SAA 1985 as their starting point.  
Commercial surrogacy would continue to be strictly prohibited.  In this sense, the 
altruistic model of surrogacy is preserved but is no longer relegated to the private 
sphere.  It may be the case that undue influence may be exercised over the 
surrogate by the commissioning party, resulting in an unconscionable bargain 
where the surrogate may not be aware of her legal rights or feels coerced into the 
arrangement.  However, this will not be the case for all arrangements.   To deny the 
involvement of contract in surrogacy for this reason implies that the surrogate’s 
decisions to engage with motherhood in this way are not her own.  Further, 
Jackson argues that even where a contract may be oppressive, ‘this does not 
necessarily represent an adequate justification for the general unenforceability of 
all surrogacy arrangements.’88  In this instance, the courts should assume a role 
much similar to the role it currently occupies – the court would determine what 
would be in the best interests of the child due to the unenforceable nature of the 
surrogacy contract.  However, for the majority, this would not be the case and the 
courts involvement retrospectively with surrogacy arrangements would be 
minimal.  In this respect, surrogacy contracts would be introduced to improve the 
legal position of those entering into voluntary surrogacy contracts but does not 
impose legal obligations upon the surrogate or commissioning party if the terms of 
the contract are found to be invalid.  Lee and Morgan observe that ‘[i]t is a classic 
characteristic of law makers and law givers that they do not, indeed, see the scene-
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as-a-whole.’89 This is also the case here.  To deny the introduction of contract law 
into the practice of surrogacy undermines the intentions of the majority of 
surrogates and commissioning parties to enter in to a legal relationship, triggering 
the parental order process.  Fears concerning the exploitation of women through 
surrogacy contracts are only a small part of the bigger picture.   
 To summarise, it is proposed here that all surrogacy arrangements should 
be governed by a contract which is enforceable by law.  Upon completion of the 
arrangement, the parental order process will be triggered automatically conferring 
legal rights and responsibility upon the intending party.  The burden is upon the 
intending party to ensure that when travelling abroad surrogacy law in the UK is 
not contravened.  Ensuring this will essentially be easier if the surrogacy contract 
is monitored in the UK as the intending party will have to enter in to a UK contract 
to be enforceable.  For those choosing not to enter the surrogacy contractual 
process, they will not be protected by the safeguards offered to surrogacy 
arrangements through screening and damages for breach of contract.  However, 
those who do not engage with the contractual process should not be prohibited 
from transferring legal status from the surrogate to the commissioning party.  It 
may be that where there is conflict in this instance, the courts will resort to a best 
interests test not inclusive of the conception method as the arrangement will not 
be enforceable in law.  However because the method of conception could not as 
relevant as it would in surrogacy contract disputes, this provides the incentive to 
ensure that surrogacy arrangements are contractual.  To deny the transfer  of 
parenthood from arrangements which are not regulated by contract however 
would not be in the best interests of the parties and most importantly, the child’s.   
4.10  Motherhood, Contract and Surrogacy 
 In addition to lack of legal involvement, a primary failing of the current legal 
approach to surrogacy is that it fails to effectively recognise in law the various 
mother roles.  This is particularly the case in relation to the surrogate (gestational 
mother) and the commissioning woman (intending mother).  This section will 
assess how this can be improved through the enactment of a new Surrogacy Act, 
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improving parity between the ‘mother’ roles in law to reflect the social reality of 
motherhood.  Contract law within surrogacy provides the opportunity to markedly 
change the law’s response to mothers.  The current hetero-normative structure of 
the law places the status of the surrogate as a gestational mother at the top of a 
hierarchical ladder of rights and responsibilities.  The law should instead respond 
to motherhood with an equitable approach to the various mother roles, principally 
because assisted reproduction methods are increasingly commonplace and the 
societal understanding of motherhood has evolved with this.  At present, the 
intending mother has no legal right or responsibilities in relation to the child.  
Surrogacy contracts would enable this to change.  The surrogacy contract would 
ensure that the intending mother’s interests in the well-being of the child are taken 
in to consideration because the contract will be enforceable in law, however what 
should happen if the surrogacy contract fails?  The intending mother may be 
awarded damages, or the court may find it to be in the best interests of the child to 
reside with her.  Is this approach correct in terms of providing equity to all 
‘mother’ roles?   
 The main concern here is that to transfer legal title away from the surrogate 
as a result of the contract, the legal title of ‘mother’ will still be attached to the 
surrogate until birth.  Although the contract will offer legal recognition to the 
intending mother, the surrogate will still be in a stronger legal position in statute 
should she change her mind due to common law misgivings concerning the role of 
‘natural’ motherhood as discussed earlier in Chapter One and providing that she 
changes her mind before giving birth.  The issue here is not that the surrogate is 
recognised as a mother; it is that the intending mother is not recognised when the 
child is conceived.  Whilst surrogacy contracts go so far in terms of achieving this, 
are there any further alternatives to be considered?  How might the law attempt to 
improve its recognition of various mother roles?  One of the reasons why the law 
may find this troublesome is that the reality of practice places these women ‘in a 
delicate position vis-à-vis one another in terms of control.’90  Both women are 
reliant upon each other to become mothers in different capacities.  The current 
legal approach heightens this as only one legal mother can be recognised at any 
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time and ‘mother’ status must be transferred through proactive consensual legal 
action between women.  It will be argued here that parenthood provisions in 
relation to surrogacy should be detached from the HFE Act and re-enacted with 
surrogacy specifically in mind.  Rethinking the parenthood provisions will ensure 
that surrogacy law is focussed centrally on those specifically involved in the 
arrangement and may also offer alternative routes through which to regulate 
surrogacy.   
4. 11 Shared Motherhood 
 To improve legal recognition of social mothers, the parenthood provisions 
must be re-shaped to reflect the social reality of motherhood.  At present, the 
parenthood provisions within the HFE Act reflect a hetero-normative 
interpretation of motherhood.  But, as discussed in Chapter One, the social reality 
for many women as mothers is that motherhood cannot be defined by pregnancy 
alone.  In the context of surrogacy, Teman found that surrogates often ‘engage in 
complex and cognitive and embodied efforts to manage their emotions, identities 
and relationships’ and did not view themselves as mothers in relation to the child 
they gave birth to.91  As a result of this, the Israeli approach is focussed upon the 
intending mother and her engagement with motherhood and with the surrogate.92  
In surrogacy arrangements motherhood is ultimately a shared process.  The social 
reality of motherhood in the context of surrogacy is thus different to the hetero-
normative ideal.  The default legal position in relation to the gestational mother 
should therefore be re-considered in the context of surrogacy.  For example, it has 
been reported in the Telegraph newspaper that the five children of Barrie and 
Tony Drewitt-Barlow call ‘Barrie Dad and Tony Daddy and refer to all four women 
as Mum’93 – all four women being either biological or gestational mother to one or 
more of the children.  The children’s terminology indicates that in a social context, 
children (if aware) do not chose and view themselves as having one mother and 
one father if born through surrogacy.  Whilst the case of Drewitt-Barlow children is 
rare as they have been well-informed about their conception and have featured 
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heavily in the media, their terminology offers insight in to the way in which the law 
should respond to surrogacy.   
 Of course, differences over the social reality of motherhood through 
surrogacy will be present.  The surrogate or intending mother may reject the idea 
of shared motherhood because in England and Wales, and Israel, the singular goal 
of surrogacy is to create only one mother,94 at least who will act in a ‘mothering’ 
capacity.  Whilst there may only be one social mother, denying motherhood as a 
shared experience undermines the actions of the surrogate and furthers 
arguments made by those who suggest surrogacy is a practice which uses women 
as a means to an end.95  It is therefore important to shape law surrounding 
surrogacy based upon the social reality that surrogacy is a shared experience of 
motherhood, and each woman who adopts the role of ‘mother’ should be treated 
equally in law.   
 For the various ‘mother’ roles to be recognised in law, shared legal title may 
offer a solution to this problem.  Legal title confers legal status and must be 
acquired by parents to act in a legal parental capacity.  At present legal title can 
only be held by one mother at one time, unlike parental responsibility which can 
be acquired by more than one woman.  Parental responsibility is a legal 
mechanism which facilitates social parenting.  Parental responsibility may be 
acquired through various legal mechanisms such as parental orders, guardianship, 
or residence orders.  Section 3 (1) of the Children Act 1989 defines parental 
responsibility as ‘all the rights, duties, powers, responsibilities and authority which 
by law a parent of a child has in relation to the child and his property’.  Legal title is 
different to responsibility and as Masson notes offers only limited rights such as 
‘inheritance rights, the right to apply to the court for any order concerning the 
child, and the right to be consulted if the child is looked after by a local authority’96.  
However these rights are enduring, and are recognised automatically in law for the 
gestational mother.  It is clear then that legal title and parental responsibility are 
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two distinct concepts, each of which could be used to provide legal recognition for 
the various ‘mother’ roles involved in surrogacy.   
 First, as argued in Chapter Two it is important for the surrogate to be 
recognised in law, particularly when IVF treatment is used and the surrogate 
becomes a patient.  Legal recognition could be conferred by automatic legal title for 
the surrogate and intending mother upon entering into a surrogacy arrangement.  
This would ensure that both the legal rights of the intending mother are protected 
during the pregnancy.  If the surrogate no longer wishes to relinquish her title 
during pregnancy she would therefore be entitled to apply for parental 
responsibility.  However, parental responsibility should be awarded (insofar as 
reasonably possible) prior to the birth of the child to sustain legal clarity and 
prevent disruption to the welfare of the child.  If it is found that parental 
responsibility is not to be awarded to the surrogate, damages for breach of 
contract should be awarded to the surrogate and vice versa.  This places each 
mother role in a position of equality, developing a level platform from which the 
courts will then be able to assess in the child’s best interests who should also be 
awarded parental responsibility should conflict occur.  The intending mother’s 
parental responsibility is automatic unless challenged during the birth.     
 It should be noted that the relevance of legal title has been criticised.  
Andrew Bainham questions, [w]hy isn’t parental responsibility enough in itself?’97 
Parental responsibility confers the practical rights in relation to parenting and 
begs the question as to why legal title is important.  Bainham’s criticisms of legal 
title suggest that the grandeur and power assigned to “full” legal title have 
overshadowed the importance of parental responsibility and the practical rights 
they confer.  In the context of surrogacy, legal title is particularly important.  At 
present, legal title confers automatic parental responsibility upon the surrogate – 
under the new Surrogacy Act this would now not happen.  Detaching legal title 
from responsibility will thus allow both the surrogate and intending mother 
recognition in law without conferring parental responsibility until birth.   
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 Currently, a parental order transferring legal status may only be applied for 
if there is a biological connection between a member of the commissioning party 
and the child.  If the intending mother does not have this biological connection and 
has not used her own eggs, the intending social mother must apply for adoption 
and experience this long and arduous process to achieve legal ‘mother’ status.  Her 
intentions to become a mother are not recognised in law from the outset, unlike 
her male/female partner whose intentions are recognised through his/her 
biological connection to the child.  Biological distinctions between mothers and 
fathers under the new current regulatory scheme will not be made.  A biological 
relationship with the child will not determine the award of legal status.  Instead, 
intention (as mentioned earlier) will be used to determine who and should be 
recognised as a legal parent.   
 The central criticism of extending the dyadic family form to potentially 
include three mothers (if the commissioning party are a lesbian partnership) is 
that ‘potential conflict would inevitably follow…or that a child with three parents 
[or four] might find the arrangement confusing or face stigma from peers’ and 
perhaps why it was not given greater consideration by Parliament during recent 
reforms of the HFE Act98.   However, McCandless and Sheldon observe that 
recognising more than two parents is being considered in other jurisdictions such 
as New Zealand where ‘[t]he New Zealand Law Commission has recommended 
changes to the law to permit a child to have three legal parents in certain 
reproductive contexts.’99  One of the central difficulties with this however is that 
where legal title is shared, how is parental responsibility determined between the 
parties should conflict occur? 
4.12 Shared Responsibility 
 Extending legal title ensures that the interests of all mother types are legally 
recognisable.  However, what should happen when interests conflict and both legal 
mother wishes to assume parental responsibility prior to birth?  Although these 
cases ‘constitute a very small proportion of all cases’100 failed surrogacy 
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arrangements create difficult legal webs.  At present there can only be one legal 
mother, however there can be more than one woman with parental responsibility 
(as is the case in the instance of step and foster mothers).  Shared parental 
responsibility is not uncommon – could this be used as a solution where conflict 
between the parties occur and all wish to care for the child?   Judicial decisions so 
far have indicated little preference in using shared responsibility as a way to 
respond to the specific way in which the child was conceived.101  To what extent 
would shared responsibility address conflict between the parties whilst ensuring 
the best interests of the child are met?   
 One real life example of this - the case of Re Evelyn102 - was the first litigated 
surrogacy case in Australia.103  This case involved a surrogacy arrangement 
between two married couples, the S’s and Q’s.  The S’s agreed that Mrs S, fertilised 
with the sperm of Mr Q would carry a child which would then be cared for by the Q 
family.  It was decided that contact should remain between the parties, ‘in 
particular, between Mrs S and the child.’104  Mrs S then decided that she no longer 
wished to be separated from the child, returning the child to her home.  Both 
parties then began court proceedings claiming it would be in the child’s best 
interest to reside with them.  This case reached the High Court of Australia where 
it was decided that Evelyn should remain in the care of her gestational mother Mrs 
S and her husband.  It was ordered by Jordan J that the two couples share the 
responsibility to care for Evelyn, with both parties participating in her long-term 
care as detailed by orders made by the court.  Wallbank argues that the decision by 
the courts to centre focus up the long, and not short, term interests of the child 
displays ‘profound wisdom’105 in this decision.  This places the interests of the 
child (beyond current circumstances) as the nucleus of the court’s decision giving 
the court wide discretion to make assessment of the child’s best interests.  
However, because of this, this decision is fact specific (and also presupposes the 
parents can provide long term) and cannot necessarily be construed as precedent 
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for the Australian courts.  In spite of this, Wallbank maintains ‘that there may be 
very real accruing to a child in knowing and forming relationships with all parties 
to the surrogacy, including any other children involved, but leaving the matter to 
individual judicial interpretations is unsatisfactory’  which may be applied to the 
UK context.     
 Wallbank argues that there are clear advantages of shared parental 
responsibility.  First, it may be in the child’s best interests to be aware of all parties 
involved in the creation and/or upbringing of the child.  Wallbank notes that the 
welfare principle is ‘notoriously indeterminate’106 and therefore requires re-
evaluation which is inclusive of intention.  Further, Wallbank comments that ‘[t]he 
diverse child sharing systems found throughout the world indicate that it may 
often-times be better to provide a broadened network of social, emotional and 
financial support.’107  A failure to incorporate the possibility of more than one 
mother is therefore detrimental to the best interests test used to determine the 
upbringing of the child. 
Ultimately, Wallbank’s argument suggests: 
 ‘....by  continuing to forward the traditional two-parent family as the 
paradigmatic form of children’s welfare and by denying the interested an input 
into the child’s life, we merely reify the social standing of child born through 
surrogacy as somehow deviant.’108 
 It is important therefore to consider different conceptions of the welfare 
test which incorporate different family structures, for example, those which utilise 
shared residence.  This would reflect the social reality of surrogacy as a shared 
experience, particularly in the context of motherhood.  Moving away from the 
dyadic family form as a structure which is best for the child, this prohibits 
reinforcing stereotypical ideas about non-normative surrogacy families as 
different and lesser to their hetero-normative counterparts.   
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 In contrast, Susan Boyd’s recent work critically reflects upon the 
constraints of shared residence.109  Boyd critiques and explores ‘tensions between 
autonomy and the expectations of mother-caregivers, in the context of normative 
trends in post-separation law.’110  Boyd suggests that autonomy of mother-
caregivers is compromised as a result of ‘socio-legal norms that increasingly 
prioritise significant involvement of fathers in children’s lives.’111  This is 
particularly problematic when shared parenting is enforced when there is no 
longer, or never has been a ‘relationship-based motivation (such as love), for 
facilitating the child’s relationship with the other parent.’112  An example of this 
would be enforced shared parenting between a lesbian mothers and sperm 
donors.113  This argument can also be applied to the surrogacy context.  There will 
be (most often) no relationship-based motivation behind the surrogacy agreement.  
As a result of this, shared residence may constrain the choices of the surrogate 
regarding where she lived or work in order to accommodate shared residence and 
to take account of the wishes of other mothers and fathers with which she has no 
relationship.114  On the other hand, Boyd notes that to emphasise women’s issues 
in relation to motherhood is taboo.115  She comments:  
 ‘As Diane Meyers has said: “Mothers are culturally represented as 
self-sacrificial, unconditionally loving, and totally identified with their 
children – the prototype of a gladly nonautonomous being.’116 
 To ignore the autonomy of the gestational mother within surrogacy would 
be to deny her choices to enter into the arrangement, regardless of whether the 
arrangement was successful.  Boyd argues that shared residence between men and 
women provides fathers with greater recognition of fathers’ rights and ‘the 
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centrality of female role in reproduction’ is challenged as a consequence of this.117  
However, relating this specifically to the context of surrogacy, shared 
responsibility would be between various female roles in reproduction as well as 
their partners.  The mother role which Boyd refers to is specifically the gestational 
role and does not incorporate ideas concerning the social and biological mothers 
and their equitable roles.  Put simply, the context of surrogacy is so different to 
non-assisted families and motherhood is conceptualised differently by women who 
engage with the ‘mother’ roles individually.     
 Boyd’s stance against shared parenting is founded upon relational theory, 
arguing that parental responsibility should be awarded based upon connection and 
established relationships with the child in favour of a ‘focus on relational aspects of 
parenting.’118  Surrogacy depicts a complex picture of various relationships 
between mother and child, each mother contributing to the creation and/or 
upbringing of the child.  It follows from this that shared residence may provide a 
route through which to deal with surrogacy disputes as each mother role 
resembles a form of connection with the child.  However, the surrogate often will 
not wish to create a relationship with the child similar to that of the intending 
mother.  To assume the surrogate desires to do so reinforce gender stereotypical 
views that motherhood and womanhood are intrinsically linked.  The objective 
here is to challenge such views.  
 The contractual model preserves the best interest test to determine 
parental responsibility where conflict should occur because issues arising at a later 
stage in the process may be curtailed due to screening and clear information 
regarding the legal process.  Relationships with the surrogate in this instance will 
not be prohibited but will not be recognised legally after the award of a parental 
order.  This approach most suitably reflects the social reality of surrogacy.  
Academic research into the relationship between surrogate and child after birth is 
limited.  Blyth observed that contact between the surrogate and child was often 
rare due to reasons including ‘the risk that the surrogate mother would be 
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continually reminded of the child she had relinquished.’119 Moreover even, if the 
surrogate and child sustain contact, this relationship would not necessarily require 
legal recognition as it would be unlikely that the surrogate would wish to make 
decisions about the child’s medical treatment, for example.   
 In summary, the various mother roles require greater recognition of law.  
This can be achieved through reformulation of the current parenthood provisions.  
Surrogate and intending social mother(s) should be assigned legal title as mothers 
until the child is born.  The surrogate will retain the right to apply for parental 
responsibility if she contests the arrangement.  This should be dealt with (insofar 
as possible) before the child is born in order to prevent any disruption to the 
welfare of the child and sustain legal clarity.  When determining who should be 
assigned parental responsibility, the courts should not exclude shared 
responsibility as a possibility to ensure that each mother can engage with social 
mothering.  Shared legal mechanisms are important within the new legal scheme 
as it challenges and breaks down the current patriarchal dyad that is represented 
in law.  The practice of surrogacy and its new regulation would therefore challenge 
the current patriarchal legal structure which upholds a traditional construction of 
motherhood.   
 Legal recognition in surrogacy is important and the current legal approach 
presents further problems in this area, particularly in relation to the surrogate’s 
husband.  The current legal framework appears to assign legal status not informed 
by intention, but by a prescribed hetero-normative structure.  The surrogate is 
automatically assigned legal status which conflicts with social reality.  Further, if 
the surrogate is married, her husband achieves automatic legal status as the father 
of the child born as a result of the arrangement.  This problem will now be 
addressed in relation to the current law’s failing to recognise the various legal 
mother roles.   
4.13 The Hetero-Normative Structure of Legal Parentage 
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 Within the majority of surrogacy arrangements the commissioning male is 
the biological father, but he is not necessarily recognised as the legal father from 
the outset.  Section 35 of the HFE Act 2008 amendments state that if at the time of 
reproductive treatment the surrogate is married, and ‘the creation of the embryo 
carried by her was not brought about with the sperm of the other party to the 
marriage, then subject to section 38(2) – (4), the male party to the marriage is to 
be treated as the legal father unless it is shown that he did not consent to the 
placing in her of the embryo or the sperm and eggs or to her artificial 
insemination.’  Providing the surrogate’s husband consents, the assignment of 
automatic status within this legal framework of surrogacy is somewhat confusing.   
 The surrogate’s husband achieves full legal status although he does not 
demonstrate an intention to fulfil the role of a social parent.  Further, if the 
surrogate is married, the biological father (who will usually be the commissioning 
father) is treated as a sperm donor.  This means that the biological father cannot be 
recognised in law unless legal rights are conferred to the commissioning father.  
However the surrogate’s husband will not acquire automatic parental 
responsibility.  Pattinson points out that the husband ‘can escape legal fatherhood 
by showing that he did not consent and is not the biological father (using DNA 
evidence)’ as the common law presumption of paternity in marriage is rebuttal as 
preserved by the HFE Act 2008120.   In spite of this, the husband’s right to legal title 
remains troublesome in the context of surrogacy.  This emphasises the reality of 
surrogacy as a practice unsupported by current legal regulation, and when it is 
support appears confused as it attempts to mirror the hetero-normative structure 
founded upon marriage and the two-parent dyadic which imitates heterosexual 
relationships.     
 However, it is clear to see how this confusion has arisen.  The parental 
status of the surrogate’s husband is preserved in order to ensure that the sperm 
donor does not receive legal recognition in a parental capacity when the 
reproductive method is IVF.  Whilst this corresponds well with legal recognition of 
the intentions of those engaging with IVF, this does not correspond well with the 
practice of surrogacy.  There is no recognisable connection (unlike gestation) 
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between the child and husband, biological or social, which begs the question as to 
why marital status dictates fatherhood?  The preservation of traditional 
constructions of ‘mother’ and ‘father’ highlights a preference toward the hetero-
normative family structure based upon marriage and causes great difficult for 
those who develop a family outside of the traditional format.   Douglas points out 
that within a legal context, ‘[w]e still refuse to face up to the reality of our 
acceptance of the importance of social parenthood’121 and this continues to be the 
case as it evidenced by the surrogate’s husband’s status.  The fatherhood 
provisions require radical reform and the legal status of the surrogate’s husband 
should be expressly removed.  The provisions highlight an urgent need for a new 
Surrogacy Act, supporting intention of the parties and wishes of those involved.  
4.14  Further Considerations 
 Under the current system, all legal title and responsibility of the surrogate 
is extinguished.  However, if the biological mother or father is a donor (and not the 
surrogate or intending parents) she remains traceable to the child.  The current 
legal position prescribes:  
 ‘[d]onors of eggs and sperm are simply deemed by law not to be 
legal parents, although their genetic offspring are now seen as having the 
right to know who they are since a policy change in 2005 curtailing donor 
anonymity after R (on the application of Rose) v Secretary of State for 
Health.’122 
Section 31ZA of the HFE Act 2008 states that an individual conceived through 
treatment services or sperm donation (excluding donation of sperm by the male 
partner of the female in receipt of treatment services) may request information 
regarding their genetic heritage at the age of 16.  Section 31ZA(4) states that if the 
person requesting information is under the age of 18 the information provided 
must be non-identifying.  Post-18 years of age, identifying information may be 
supplied.  The removal of donor anonymity adds a further caveat to the surrogacy 
debate.  A child conceived via surrogacy will be able to access information 
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regarding their genetic mother or father, but not the surrogate.  Although 
becoming a surrogate or egg donor signals intention not to be recognised in a 
social capacity as a mother, legal recognition of their role in the child’s creation 
should be available.  Wallbank notes that ‘it may be likely that the child will suffer 
some distress to learning the furore surrounding her birth’123.  In order to prevent 
this, the introduction of surrogacy contracts mean that the names of the parties 
involved will be preserved in a legal document.  Like donor information, this 
should be available to the child.  The onus should be upon surrogacy clinics and 
agencies to monitor this information.  Currently little information is known about 
surrogacy families and preservation of such records will ensure that official 
statistics will be available, and further research may be done examining the impact 
of surrogacy on children.   
 Carl Lind and Tom Hewitt observe that the importance of biological 
parenthood may not subside.  They suggest: ‘Giving the rising interest in our 
genetic origins and our ancestry (probably for no better reason that that we are 
inquisitive beings and that science is able to enlighten us) the biological fact of 
parenthood...will, it is submitted, continue to have growing social currency.’124  
This argument can also be applied to surrogate births.  The surrogate performs a 
key role in the birth of the child and there may be a rise in interest from her 
gestational offspring regarding their conception which should be addressed by 
law.     
4.15  Conclusion 
 Gamble and Ghevaert comment that ‘[t]he amendments to the law 
introduced by the 2008 Act...represent an evolution of the existing legal 
framework, rather than a revolutionary re-think of fertility and parenthood law.’125 
This implies the government are refraining from dedicating sufficient time and 
research into the practice of surrogacy to provide regulation which caters for all 
parties involved.  The legal regulation of surrogacy and motherhood broadly 
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continues to impose hetero-normative essentialist upon those it seeks to regulate.  
As a result of this, surrogacy law must be reshaped accordingly.   
 In 1986, Andrea Stumpf argued that ‘[o]nly a holistic approach to surrogate 
motherhood arrangements can consistently reach the appropriate result’126 and it 
is this reality that legislators and courts alike are failing to address.  A holistic 
approach to surrogacy and motherhood is required and can only be achieved 
through redefining motherhood and reshaping the law.  The two-parent dyadic 
structure should be extended, incorporating and recognising various mother roles 
outside of the hetero-normative ideal.   
 Prior to the enactment of the 2008 Act, Lord Darzi of Denham commented 
on the aims of the reform, stating that ‘We have not tried to fix what is not broken, 
nor have we thrown the baby out with the bathwater’.127  Difficult ethical and 
moral debate surrounding surrogacy should be reintroduced to the public and 
politicians alike in order to re-clarify the legal regulation of surrogacy and improve 
social awareness of the practice.  If surrogacy regulation is be effective, it must be 
developed upwards from the practice itself as a shared experience of motherhood - 
changing the legal bath water without upsetting the baby.   
 Effective surrogacy regulation will be achieved through enactment of a new 
Surrogacy Act which utilises intention to determine who is recognised as a legal 
parent.  Intention will be the impetus behind enforceable contractual relationships 
that will be possible if ideas presented in this chapter are adopted.  Contract law 
will guide the surrogacy arrangement with a view to improving legal involvement 
in the process of surrogacy and providing greater recognition to the various 
‘mother’ roles.  Greater recognition of the ‘mother’ roles will be achieved through 
automatic shared legal title for all mothers involved in the surrogacy process.  This 
protects both the surrogate and the intending social mother(s) providing them 
with the legal right to apply for parental responsibility.  This challenges the 
patriarchal dyadic structure of law currently enshrined within surrogacy 
legislation which permits the recognition of only one legal parent.  If the surrogacy 
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arrangement is contested, shared parental responsibility should be viewed by the 
courts as a possible alternative to the current response which favours gestational 
parenthood as evidenced in case law discussed in Chapter Two.   Shared 
parental responsibility and legal title reflect the social reality of motherhood in the 
context of motherhood as a shared experience.  Each ‘mother’ role is equal in the 
context of surrogacy to the creation and upbringing of the child.  Ultimately, this 
new holistic approach to surrogacy regulation reflects the complexities of 
motherhood within this context.   
 Munro argues that surrogacy ought to be ‘evaluated by feminist theory in 
terms of its effects upon the power dynamics that perpetuate feminist concerns 
and that provoke the feminist aims highlighted at the outset’128 and through 
challenging the hetero-normative ideals that are currently enshrined, it is hoped 
that feminist concerns about surrogacy and motherhood are lessened.  Changing 
the murky bath water which surrounds the baby by virtue of a new Surrogacy Act 
provides greater legal recognition not only to non-normative mothers, but most 
importantly to the baby and its relationship with his/her mother(s).    
                                                             




There may not be anything “new” about surrogacy as a social practice, but its 
relevance within society through its relationship with motherhood is a persistent 
feminist concern.  What is “new” and most interesting about surrogacy is that it 
openly and obviously challenges gendered constructions of motherhood, maternity 
and ultimately women.  Surrogacy thus can be used as a lens through which to 
assess the legal response to motherhood.  In doing so, this thesis concludes that the 
current legal response to motherhood in the context of surrogacy presents a static 
hetero-normative idealisation of who mothers are and what they do.  The current 
legal response to surrogacy fails to distinguish between the various ‘mother’ roles 
adequately and by doing so reinforces motherhood as a gendered concept founded 
upon an instinctive maternal bond.  Concluding thoughts here will summarise the 
findings of this thesis broadly, before offering final thoughts regarding how the 
legal approach to surrogacy should develop.     
5.1 Conflicting Constructions 
In Chapter One, the social construction of motherhood was outlined as a multi-
faceted concept but one which is easily recognisable.  The social construction of 
motherhood is changeable and how women identify themselves as mothers will be 
variable.  Women engage with motherhood in various ways, through gestation, 
genetics and mothering.  This reality should thus be reflected in legal regulation of 
motherhood.  The legal regulation of motherhood recognises the multi-faceted 
nature of motherhood as law permits legal motherhood to be shared between 
various women through parental responsibility.  However, in the context of 
assisted reproduction, this willingness to recognise various forms of ‘natural’ 
motherhood is compromised particularly in the context of surrogacy.  Assisted 
reproduction methods openly distinguish the various types of motherhood and it is 
therefore troubling that the law fails to recognise and attach legal protection to 
these roles equally.  Enshrined in the HFE Act 1990 (as amended by the HFE Act 
2008) and in cases such as Re P1 the gestational mother is always recognised as the 
legal mother, even though her intentions to reject social maternity (as in the 
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context of surrogacy) are clear.  This indicates that the social and legal 
constructions of motherhood are in tension.  The problem here is not that legal 
constructions of motherhood fail to recognise the ‘various’ mothers roles because 
the transferral of motherhood is assisted through adoption or residence orders.  
Problems arise when the transferral of motherhood is pre-conceived and pre-
conception.  In the context of surrogacy, this will almost always be the case, but the 
current legal framework fails to recognise this.  Recognising non-normative 
mothers in law is essential if law is to reflect the social reality of motherhood thus 
ensuring the autonomy of women.     
The two-tier legal structure currently in place either regulates medically-assisted 
arrangements utilising IVF regulated by the HFE Act 1990 (as amended by the HFE 
Act 2008) or where surrogacy is carried out in the home, is left entirely 
unregulated.   The initial response to surrogacy as detailed in the Warnock Report2 
was one of great hostility and this led to difficult beginnings for the legal regulation 
of surrogacy law.  In spite of this, the opportunity for reform arose many years 
later during the review of the HFE Act (1990).  Unfortunately, the legislative 
response to surrogacy was minimal.  Actively refraining from legal interference, 
the altruistic model of surrogacy is preserved, but it is the model of surrogacy most 
at odds with the social reality of motherhood.  The altruistic legal model of 
surrogacy does not acknowledge the intentions of the surrogate to reject her 
maternity as a legal and social mother.  Instead, legal motherhood may be 
transferred after birth which creates a difficult legal picture when the child is born.  
Although it is clear who the child’s legal mother is, this does not reflect the social 
situation and family arrangement.  By declining to acknowledge the social reality of 
surrogate motherhood in the first instance, the traditional construction of ‘mother’ 
as a gestational carrier and social provider is entrenched.  This is not purely 
symbolic either.  The transferral of motherhood is an ardours process, made 
difficult by the restrictive parental order process.  In summary, the legal regulation 
of surrogacy is troublesome as it shores up gendered and outdated constructions 
of mothers.     
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5. 2 New Beginnings 
Considering the systematic failings of current surrogacy regulation through the 
HFE Act 1990 (as amended by the HFE Act 2008) further engendering motherhood 
as a hetero-normative construct, the immediacy for legal reform is apparent.  
Whilst of course there will be no consensus on how surrogacy should be regulated 
- feminist or otherwise - potential solutions do exist.  It is argued that a new 
Surrogacy Act is urgently required, offering a fresh perspective on a practice that is 
so different to, but regulated alongside, other assisted reproduction methods.   
A new Surrogacy Act will quell the current tension between social and legal 
constructions of motherhood as it should incorporate intention as a determining 
factor of legal parentage.  So far, surrogacy regulation has relied heavily upon 
gestational relationships to determine parentage – an approach which is clearly at 
odds with how motherhood is recognised socially.  This was recognised in the case 
of Re G and lessons can be learnt from this case in terms of how motherhood 
should be perceived legally.  Baroness Hale’s separation of ‘natural’ parent roles as 
gestation, genetic and social must be utilised, and coupled with intention in the 
context of surrogacy.  This allows for women who engage with surrogacy in any of 
the ‘mother’ roles to self-identify as mothers based upon their intentions.  Self-
identity is fundamental in social constructions of motherhood and this should be 
translated in law.   
Introduction of intention to determine parentage means that surrogacy contracts 
will no longer have to remain unregulated in law as legal regulation will reflect 
social reality.  At present, legal regulation of surrogacy confines motherhood as 
hetero-normative through automatic legal status to a surrogate who does not wish 
to be recognised as a mother, socially or legally, ignoring her intentions.  How the 
law might track the intentions of the surrogacy parties is by contractual 
enforcement of the agreement, as can be seen in other jurisdictions such as Israel.  
Concerns regarding the impact of contractual enforcement in the area of surrogacy 
should not be disregarded, but it is argued here that through re-envisioning the 
use of legal title and parental responsibility to reflect the shared experience of 
motherhood that is evident in surrogacy, criticisms of contractual involvement 
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with surrogacy can be addressed.  Moreover, through improved regulation those 
who are entering into surrogacy arrangements will be able to make informed 
decisions as their legal position and responsibilities will be effectively 
communicated and monitored thereby reducing the possibility of future difficulties 
and problems regarding legal parentage.  A new Surrogacy Act incorporating 
intention, shared legal title and greater consideration of the possibility of shared 
parental responsibility will lead to effective legal regulation of surrogacy, 
providing equal protection to the parties involved and ultimately protecting the 
best interest of the child as intentions to engage with social parenting are tracked 
and identifiable.   
5. 3 Concluding Thoughts 
 Surrogacy is abound with complex ethical dilemmas, and it is for the role of 
law to respond to this and facilitate the choices of those who chose surrogacy as 
their method of conception in the interests of the child and autonomy of 
individuals to make reproductive choices.  Horsey observes that:  
 ‘Because methods of creating children by 'non-natural' means or by 
those requiring medical intervention have greatly increased, and perhaps 
also because of increased popular exposure to assisted reproductive 
techniques, it has become necessary for us to rethink how parenthood is 
defined in such situations.3 
 How parenthood is defined, as this thesis has argued, is essential to 
determine how the law does, and should, respond to assisted reproduction.  A 
legislative rethink of the way in which motherhood in particular is defined in law is 
urgently required.  At present, law and society are in tension regarding 
motherhood.  As an example of non-normative motherhood, surrogacy is 
representative of contemporary motherhood which can take many forms.  Conflict 
between social and legal constructions of motherhood serves only to impact upon 
the autonomy of women and the lives they lead as mothers.  It has been over 20 
years since the enactment of the SAA 1985 with relatively little legislative change 
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or discussion since, particularly in relation to a legal framework which regulates 
all surrogacy arrangements.  It is now time to rethink surrogacy regulation with a 
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